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THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL POWER: SOME
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY DECISION
STEPHEN L. CARTERI
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a society that chooses with increasing frequency to
leave its most difficult questions for judicial resolution. Until recently,
however, the problem of how to punish a miscreant who happens to
reside in the White House had never been tossed into the courts. When
the President went wrong, the political system dealt with him.
Presidents have gone wrong frequently. Presidents have been ac-
cused of misconduct in office for about as long as there have been Presi-
dents.1 If the more recent Chief Executives sometimes seem to have
been especially fond of abusing their powers,2 that may only be because
historians, viewing the distant past through the glass of folklore, have
been kind.
Rarely have formal punishments for presidential misconduct been
meted out. Only one President has been impeached. None has ever
been convicted. The process, moreover, has been decidedly political:
The three Presidents who came closest to being formally removed from
office-John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Richard Nixon-were ex-
traordinarily unpopular by the time Congress began to act against
them. In general, presidential abuse of authority has been punished, if
at all, through legislative actions short of impeachment, through failure
of reelection, or through trashing of the President's historical image.
The federal courts have played only a limited role in keeping Presi-
dents within the bounds of the law. When they have reviewed presiden-
tial actions, they have almost always done so indirectly through the fic-
tion of a suit against the official charged with implementing the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1976, Stanford University;
J.D. 1979, Yale University.
I am grateful to Enola Aird, Guido Calabresi, Robert Cover, Martha Minow,
Peter Schuck, and Harry Wellington for their thoughtful and generous criticism on
earlier versions of this essay. I have also benefitted from the efforts of Dean Hashimoto
and Gerard Nolan, who referred me to a number of useful sources.
' See generally RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT
(C. Woodward ed. 1974).
2 See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Bernstein, The
Road to Watergate and Beyond. The Growth and Abuse of Executive Authority Since
1940, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 58.
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disputed policy.' Until just a few years ago, courts routinely dismissed
actions naming the President as a defendant.4 The courts willingly sent
signals to the other branches on the constitutionality of presidential
acts, but they refused to proceed against the President directly.
So matters stood when, in the summer of 1974, a unanimous Su-
preme Court ruled in United States v. Nixon that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, the President was a proper subject for judicial process.5
The Court found judicial process appropriate where the President had
custody of tape recordings subpoenaed for use in a criminal case. By
refusing to quash the subpoena, the Justices raised a fresh question,
one that prior practice had avoided: What if the President refuses to
comply? That question became moot; he did comply, leaving legal
scholars to speculate on whether the federal courts could have held him
in contempt if he had not.
This Article speculates that the contempt issue should be viewed
as part of a larger question: Who has the authority to punish the Presi-
dent when he violates his oath? Punishment of the President, the Arti-
cle suggests, is in essence a political task. The Article takes as its point
of departure Nixon v. Fitzgerald,8 decided by the Court early in the
summer of 1982. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the presidential immunity
decision of this Article's title, a sharply divided Court ruled that an
individual's suit for damages was not a circumstance in which subject-
ing the President to judicial process was appropriate.7 The message of
that case may well be that had the President not turned over the tapes
at issue in United States v. Nixon, the federal courts could have done
3 Through the years, many a landmark decision has been rendered in this man-
ner. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (suit against Secre-
tary of State); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The
Steel Seizure Case) (suit against Secretary of Commerce); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) (The Iranian Assets Case) (suit against Secretary of Treasury).
Before the Court's 1952 decision in Youngstown, presidential actions challenged in fed-
eral court through this subterfuge were invariably sustained. See Kauper, The Steel
Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141,
144-51 (1952).
" See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Livingston v.
Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
5 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974).
6 457 U.S. 731 (1982). This point is as good as any for a confession and a dis-
claimer. The author first became interested in these issues while serving as a law clerk
to Justice Marshall during the Term in which the first presidential immunity case,
Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), came before the Court. The judgment in
that case was affirmed by an equally divided Court. The author had no part in any
deliberations concerning the second presidential immunity case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
which provides the springboard for analysis in this essay. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, was
briefed, argued, and decided after the author completed his clerkship.
" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748.
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nothing at all: the constitutional analysis in Nixon v. Fitzgerald leads
almost ineluctably to the proposition that the judicial power of the
United States does not include the authority to punish the President of
the United States.
That conclusion is not indefensible, but in a society premised on
the rule of law, it ought to be controversial. Early commentary on
Nixon v. Fitzgerald focused on whether the case was rightly decided, 8
rather than on the implications of the decision. Those implications,
however, have both practical and theoretical significance, not because
they spell doom for the republic,9 but because the reasoning and the
result in the presidential immunity decision reflect a particular view of
the judicial role in the system of checks and balances.
This view of the judiciary's role rests on something that those
trained in the law do not always like to admit: the Constitution
prescribes a system of government as well as of law, a political system
as well as a legal one. The courts do not do everything that is necessary
to govern the country, and when they act within the system of checks
and balances, they are playing a political role. This system is dynamic
and usually operates without judicially-enforceable rules. When the
branches conflict, the winner will be not the one that cites the most
cases but the one that can muster the most political support.
Judicial power to reach misconduct within the other branches of
government thus has a political aspect. The power is exercised within a
system of checks and balances, and the creation of any new remedy
against one of the branches of government must affect the entire system.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald suggests a judicial reluctance to create new reme-
dies against the executive branch-even where needful to right a
wrong-except in instances of the most compelling necessity. Demon-
strating that the Fitzgerald result derives from the dual political and
legal nature of the system requires that the Court's reasoning be re-
8 See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 226-36
(1982) (Nixon v. Fitzgerald result is departure from precedent); Flanz, The Constitu-
tion Does Not Grant Presidential Immunity, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1982, at E 14, col. 4
(letter to the editor) (no constitutional basis for the decision).
' After all, the United States has had Presidents for nearly two hundred years and
none has ever been sued successfully for damages. That potential civil liability has been
an important factor in presidential decisionmaking over the past two centuries is diffi-
cult to believe and impossible to prove. Moreover, the decisions that ultimately are the
most important in the nation's history-whether to go to war, whom to nominate to the
Supreme Court, how to structure a new regulatory initiative-would fall outside the
reach of anyone's proposal for civil liability. Even Justice White's Nixon v. Fitzgerald
dissent, which was joined by three other Justices, would apparently have granted abso-
lute immunity for the performance of "a constitutionally assigned executive function,
the performance of which would be substantially impaired by the possibility of a pri-
vate action for damages." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 785.
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viewed in some detail, dissected, and then reassembled in slightly differ-
ent form. This analysis will make possible a consideration of what the
case really says about the judicial role in checking and balancing the
other branches of the federal government and what it implies for the
relationship of the other two branches with one another.
II. DISSECTING THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY DECISION
A. What the Court Said
To understand what really happened in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it is
important to recall the context in which it arose. The plaintiff, a dis-
charged civil servant, sued for damages based on causes of action that
he claimed were properly to be implied from federal law and from the
Constitution.1" These implied causes of action were the ones that the
Supreme Court refused to recognize in a suit against the President of
the United States even though the Court had recognized similar causes
of action with respect to persons other than the President. That the
rejected causes of action were "implied" matters because implied rights
of action make little sense as anything except common law, which is to
say law created by judges."' Although the Supreme Court has tried
various other explanations for what federal courts do when they imply
a right to sue, 2 a statute or clause not expressly providing a right to
sue cannot reasonably be said to "create" one. Even if implying a pri-
vate right of action is viewed as an exercise in statutory construction, it
1 The trial court held that Fitzgerald had stated causes of action under the first
amendment, under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979) (which grants executive employ-
ees the right to give congressional testimony), and under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. III
1979) (which makes obstruction of congressional testimony a crime). 457 U.S. at 740-
41 & n.20. The majority stated that the implication issue was not before the Court, id.,
but as the text makes clear, that is arguably the very question the Court decided.
n See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800 (2d ed.
1973); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975); Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of
Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355
(1980).
"2 For instance, at one time the Court explained that, in implying a right to sue, it
was applying the common-law statutory tort doctrine. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). In the mid-1960's, the Court explained that it was merely
applying those remedies "necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). More recently, the Court has promul-
gated a four-part "test" for implying private rights to sue. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975). In the last several Terms, some of the Justices have suggested that the
only proper question is whether Congress, at the time it enacted the legislation in ques-
tion, actually "intended" to permit private suits. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 718-30 (White, J.,
joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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is the judge who performs the delicate surgery necessary to graft a right
to sue onto a substantive provision.13
Thus one point about Nixon v. Fitzgerald is immediately appar-
ent: a decision for the plaintiff would have constituted the judicial crea-
tion of a particular type of remedy for presidential misconduct. The
Court would not have been the umpire, but one of the players. 4 Judi-
cial activity of this sort is not by itself a bad thing; courts, after all, sit
to create remedies as much as they sit to do anything else. 5 If, how-
ever, a decision for Fitzgerald would have meant judicial imposition of
a new remedy-one not mentioned in the Constitution-against the
President, then the extent of judicial power to do so must be considered.
Before this issue may be discussed in any detail, a second point
must be made. The majority opinion in the presidential immunity case
may be read in two ways: either as a common law decision or as a
constitutional decision. Nixon v. Fitzgerald clearly need not be viewed
as a definitive constitutional holding. After all, if an implied right of
action is a common law remedy, then the same court that has the power
to create the remedy if it is a good idea, has the power to limit its scope.
A decision to limit a common law remedy would make a statement
about prudence, not about power. If Nixon v. Fitzgerald states a con-
stitutional rule, then future Presidents will be immune from suit. If, on
the other hand, the majority merely stayed its hand because to do other-
wise at the time would have been imprudent, then the next case might
easily be decided differently.
Nowhere does the majority actually state that its decision confers a
constitutional immunity, although the opinion includes dicta that may
be read to so indicate. The opinion is, however, full of references to
1, The Court's rhetoric has often treated the process as one of statutory construc-
tion, but the conclusion that implied rights of action amount to judge-made law is not
so easily avoided. For precisely this reason at least one Justice has recently expressed
reservations about the entire implication question, suggesting that the creation of a
right to sue is a legislative responsibility and that by creating the right themselves, the
Justices may be violating the doctrine of separation of powers. See Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). But see Greene,
Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Separation of
Power Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469 (1980) (separation of powers doctrine presents no
bar to implication of remedies).
14 This distinction between the roles that the Court plays in different kinds of
constitutional adjudication is discussed in somewhat greater detail infra text accompa-
nying notes 107-23.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 131-33.
18 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747 (immunity decisions "have been
guided by the Constitution") (emphasis added); id. at 748 ("implicit in the nature of
the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers"); id. at 749 (immunity is "rooted in
the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers") (emphasis added). The opin-
1983]
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what constitutes proper public policy. At the outset the Court an-
nounces that its inquiry will necessarily involve "the kind of 'public
policy' analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court." ' Later
the majority explains: "Cognizance of . . .personal vulnerability fre-
quently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detri-
ment not only of the President and his office but also the Nation that
the Presidency was designed to serve."' 8 A cause of action against the
President, the Court says a few sentences later, is not "needed to serve
broad public interests."' 9 And in an ambiguous sentence at the end of
its opinion, the Court concludes that its rule of absolute immunity will
"advance compelling public ends."' The thrust of the Court's reason-
ing is simply that civil damages liability for the President is not a good
idea. The majority opinion makes repeated references to such concepts
as "the separation of powers,"2 but it is impossible to tell whether the
Court means to suggest that constitutional principles mandate the re-
sult, or simply that they help show why immunity is good policy.22
There is, of course, nothing unusual in the Court's undertaking
ion contains no express statement along the lines of: "This immunity is required by the
Constitution."
17 Id. at 748.
18 Id. at 753.
'1 Id. at 754.
20 Id. at 758. The sentence is ambiguous because a fair reading of it would also be
that Fitzgerald's claim was to a remedy "in order to advance compelling public ends."
21 See supra note 16.
22 Id. Chief Justice Burger, member of the five-person majority, made clear in his
concurring opinion that he considers presidential immunity firmly grounded in the
Constitution and the separation of powers. See 457 U.S. 731, 758-64. His opinion also
implies that other officials who have been held immune from various types of lawsuits
enjoy an immunity that is constitutional in scope. See id. at 764 ("the Court's holding
places a President on essentially the same footing with judges and other officials whose
absolute immunity we have recognized"). One cannot so easily explain the Court's de-
cisions granting immunity to prosecutors and judges in terms of a constitutionally based
immunity. Cases such as Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors),
and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judges), did not purport to do
anything but determine whether the common law tradition and the public interest cre-
ated an immunity that survived the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). Although the Court could perhaps have formulated an argument that these im-
munities are constitutionally mandated, it did not do so in those cases. In particular,
nothing in those cases suggested that Congress could not, if it so chose, abrogate the
immunity by statute. A state legislature presumably has similar power to abrogate im-
munity. If, as the Chief Justice seems to suggest, however, state judicial or
prosecutorial immunity is conferred by the Constitution, then it could not be abrogated
by legislative action. These cases should be distinguished from those involving members
of Congress, see infra note 117, which clearly found a constitutionally based immunity
from suit.
The fact that the Chief Justice felt it necessary to write the separate opinion that
he did suggests that at least one member of the majority regarded the Court's view as
less than entirely clear.
HeinOnline -- 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1346 1982-1983
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
public policy analysis on constitutional issues, and under the Constitu-
tion's more open-ended clauses, analysis of this kind is virtually the
norm.2" The legitimacy of constitutional reasoning is much enhanced,
however, when it is tied expressly to the Constitution itself.2 When the
Court's arguments are not directly tied to the Constitution, as they
were not in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the resulting policy analysis is gener-
ally open to a scathing retort: "Sez who?" If, on the other hand, the
Court merely used its inherent discretion to place limits on a cause of
action it had itself created by using common-law authority, then the
answer "Sez we" is more than adequate. The common law is what the
judges say it is. 5
Thus "presidential immunity decision" must turn out to be some-
thing of a misnomer. If the Supreme Court merely decided that it
would not extend a judicially-created remedy to the President, because
doing so would be a bad thing, then the decision takes on spectacular
unimportance. On that reading, Nixon v. Fitzgerald decided not a
point of constitutional doctrine, but a point of common law. The state-
ment the case made was then about prudence, not about power, and
Congress, should it muster the political will, can overturn that state-
ment by legislative action. The fact that the majority reserved the ques-
tion whether Congress may subject the President to civil damages lia-
bility through statute2" adds weight to the hypothesis that the case is
merely one of common law and therefore decided relatively little.
If Nixon v. Fitzgerald did not decide whether the President pos-
sesses an immunity that is constitutional in scope, then the question of
judicial power posed so ominously a few paragraphs back remains
2S See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24 For ambitious attempts to tie some of the Court's "public policy" decisions to
the Constitution, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928-30 (1973) (defending Griswold); Perry, Abortion, The
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 23 UCLA L. Rv. 689, 723-34 (1976) (defending Roe v. Wade).
'5 That is not to say that the development of common law rules should or can be
altogether unprincipled. On the contrary, appeal to principle is essential. The distinc-
tion between common law rulemaking and constitutional rulemaking generally lies in
the sources of the principles to which the appeal is made. See generally Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
28 457 U.S. at 749 n.27 ("In the present case we ... are presented only with
'implied' causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question as it
would arise if Congress expressly had created a damage action against the President of
the United States."); cf. id. at 763 n.7 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("once it is estab-
lished that the Constitution confers absolute immunity, . . . legislative action cannot
alter that result"); id. at 765-66 (White, J., dissenting) (if the Constitution creates the
immunity, Congress cannot abrogate it by statute).
1983]
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open.217 After all, if Congress can constitutionally create a civil damages
remedy against the President, then it is hard to imagine what constitu-
tional principles would prevent the federal courts from doing so as
well.28 Courts were creating remedies for official misconduct long
before there was a United States of America, 9 and nothing in the Con-
stitution appears to have stripped them of that power."0 So if Congress
is indeed free to overrule the presidential immunity decision, then per-
haps no constitutional rule was intended after all.
A judicial opinion, however, is rarely a complete explanation of
why a court has decided a case in a particular way." The Court's
statement that the congressional power issue should be left open need
not be read as an indication that in the minds of the Justices in the
majority, the issue truly is open. Peeking behind the scenes is impossi-
ble,3 2 but any number of plausible reasons for "reserving" the question
immediately spring to mind. The reservation might have been made to
hold a majority, to make the decision more palatable to the public and
to scholars, to gain a sixth or seventh vote in order that the outcome
seem more decisive, or for some other reason. The reservation might
also reflect a genuine concern on the part of one or more of the Justices
that the power of the federal courts to create new remedies against the
President may be distinguishable constitutionally from the power of
Congress to create such remedies.33
A hypothesis that the Constitution grants broader authority to
27 The Court has posed the question before, and has even implied an answer. See
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (federal court cannot issue order
against President), discussed infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
28 But see infra text accompanying 34-39. On the other hand, one can easily im-
agine principles that would prevent the state courts from assuming the constitutional
power to punish the President. State courts are often appropriate forums for the vindi-
cation of federal rights, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), but the federal courts
play a special role in the system of checks and balances, see generally THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 (J. Madison) (system of checks and balances); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 81
(A. Hamilton) (special judicial role).
28 See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 30-36 (1983).
"0 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying right
to sue from constitutional protections). This should not be taken to suggest that the
power to create remedies is without limits. As will become clear, the thrust of this
Article is quite to the contrary.
a' See generally W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
22 But see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT (1979) (historical fiction).
"a See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweep-
ing Clause," 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975) (suggesting that necessary and proper
clause generates comparatively broad congressional power to create new remedies
against other branches).
[Vol. 131:1341
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Congress than to the courts to create remedies against the President
would not be an unreasonable one. For example, one might argue that
because the constitutional system places so many express checks on
presidential power directly in the legislative branch," that branch also
ought to have special authority (if anyone has it) to create new ones.
After all, legislating is by definition an innovative activity, and any con-
gressional statute dealing with the executive branch is likely to circum-
scribe presidential authority in some manner.3 5 If the Congress can
limit the President's authority, why can't it legislate to punish him
directly?
The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of
197438 may be seen as an example of punitive legislation. Every other
President has been permitted to collect his papers and dispose of them
as he pleased upon leaving the White House. The Act denied that priv-
ilege to Richard Nixon. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices,37 the Court upheld the Act against, among other things, a separa-
tion of powers challenge. The Court conceded that the President had
strong claims of confidentiality, but, it explained, in the narrow circum-
stances surrounding the Nixon resignation, Congress had the power to
revoke the President's traditional "privilege" of retaining his papers
and effects.38 The Act was a creative remedy for presidential miscon-
duct and was upheld even though the Act may have resulted more from
congressional pique than from concern for the accuracy of his historical
record. The point is that the Court permitted the Congress (whatever
its motivation) to act innovatively to impose a punishment that the
Court itself could not have imposed." By analogy, Congress might, in
the proper circumstances, have the constitutional authority to create
civil damages remedies against the President, even if the federal courts
34 Several of these checks are discussed in more detail infra, notes 185-203 and
accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (sus-
taining congressional authority to limit President's removal power).
36 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976).
S 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
38 Id. at 441-46. The Court did not address other constitutional arguments against
the Act's application to specific documents. See id. at 436-39. One commentator has
suggested that Nixon retains certain first and fourth amendment rights. See Note, Gov-
ernment Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J. 1601 (1978).
39 In a proper case, a court can order one who has custody of evidence to preserve
it, but the Act went well beyond the need to preserve presidential materials for any
particular litigation. The distinction drawn in the text should not be carried too far. To
say that a court cannot create the same remedies as Congress can is not to say that the
court has less power to create the remedies that it has traditionally created. See infra
text accompanying notes 131-56.
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lack power to do so.40 If the Constitution gives Congress greater power
than it gives the judiciary to create remedies against the President, then
the majority's reservation of the congressional power issue does not pre-
vent the decision's being read as a constitutional one or necessitate its
being read as a common law one.
This is, of course, sheer speculation. Nevertheless, the mere possi-
bility that the Constitution authorizes broader powers for the Congress
than the courts means that the dissent may be correct in characterizing
the opinion as stating a constitutional rule. As the dissenters read the
majority opinion, the majority has said that something about the Con-
stitution-the majority leaves unclear precisely what-prohibits the
courts from creating a civil damages remedy against the President. Be-
cause a constitutional immunity is likely-though not certain-to bar
Congressional action as effectively as it does judicial action, a finding
that the courts cannot impose a particular penalty probably means that
the Congress cannot impose it either. 4' Although safe from judicially
and congressionally created remedies, the President would not be
"above the law." The only sanctions available in the event of his misbe-
havior, however, would be those explicitly set forth in or readily in-
ferred from the Constitution itself.
B. What the Court (Might Have) Meant
The majority denied the charge that its opinion placed the Presi-
dent above the law,' 2 and yet clearly knew that its decision would leave
40 Naturally, the mere fact that Congress's authority to legislate to control the
President is broad does not imply that the authority is unlimited. As with other con-
gressional powers, it must be exercised in a manner consistent with other provisions of
the Constitution and, in particular, must not be used in derogation of the principles of
separation of powers. For an important recent reminder of this rule, see Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 194-202.
41 Congress might be able to circumvent the presidential immunity decisions (even
if the Court meant to establish a constitutional rule) by extending the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2880 (1976), to encompass actions for damages caused
by presidential act or order. Cf. P. ScsiucK, supra note 29, at 113-18 (analogous pro-
posal for wrongs by lower-level officials). As long as the defendant in a suit under the
amended Act would be the United States and not the President and as long as any
judgments would be paid from general revenues and not passed on to the President,
then most of the constitutional objections to presidential liability would fall. If the Pres-
ident were asked to produce papers or appear personally in connection with such a suit,
considerations of separation of powers would likely permit him to refuse. I am grateful
to Martha Minow and Peter Schuck for bringing these points to my attention.
42 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting) ("the Court
clothes the office of the President with sovereign immunity, placing it beyond the law"),
and id. at 758 n.41 (majority opinion) ("This contention is rhetorically chilling but
wholly unjustified.").
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little besides the sanctions explicitly authorized by the Constitution to
check the conduct of an evil President.43 The majority noted that im-
peachment and other "formal and informal checks" would remain
available.44 Unless reliance is placed on historical references that may
not bear the weight,45 the references to other constitutional sanctions
(along with the vague allusions, already mentioned, to the separation of
powers) are as close as the majority comes to tying its reasoning to the
Constitution itself. The result has an air of expressio unius: because the
Constitution creates particular checks on presidential authority, a court
may not create fresh ones.
The Court cannot really have meant to deny the validity of any
check not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. After all, U.S. v.
Nixon held that the courts can command the President to comply with
subpoenas despite the lack of explicit textual support for such a power.
Nevertheless, the Court's expressio unius approach may form the basis
of a theory explaining the result.46 The Presidency (the Court may
4s The term "evil President," like the term "immunity," is used advisedly. Al-
though the lines might be difficult to draw, nothing in the presidential immunity deci-
sion suggests that a President who, for example, injured someone through negligence
not related to his office would necessarily be immune from suit. Nixon v. Fitzgerald by
its terms immunizes the President only from suits relating to his official conduct and
abuses of his official authority. One possible brightline would distinguish between those
things that he is able to do only because he is President and those things that anyone
could do. The former would come within the scope of his immunity and the latter
would not. Obviously, a private citizen would not have the opportunity to fire a civil
servant. The President of the United States might or might not have the authority to do
so, but his office would provide the opportunity. There is no need to make too much of
this distinction, and some of the arguments in the text admittedly cut against it. This
distinction is, however, one approach to making the result in the presidential immunity
case more palatable to those who find it distasteful.
44 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 757.
4 The majority consigned its historical discussion to a single lengthy footnote. Id.
at 750-52 n.31. Justice White's dissent vigorously disputed the majority's reading of the
history, see id. at 771-79, which may be why the Court did not belabor it. The majority
could, however, have constructed a stronger historical argument than the one it actually
used. See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
" Of course, a demand for theory may be naive or even a cheap shot in these days
of doubt as to whether the Supreme Court is institutionally capable of principled deci-
sionmaking. Scholarship from all points on the ideological compass has contributed to
the doubt. See, e.g., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982)
(interest of decisionmaking elite, rather than positive theory, determines outcome); Eas-
terbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REy. 802 (1982) (Arrow's theo-
rem demonstrates that no structure can ensure consistent outcomes if Court complies
with other norms of judicial decisionmaking); Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57
TEx. L. REv. 1361 (1979) (judicial activism leads inexorably to doctrinal inconsis-
tency); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980) (contradictions in liberal democratic
theory make consistent constitutional theory impossible). The conclusions drawn in
these articles may be right or wrong; for the purposes of the analysis in this Article, I
will pretend that theory is both desirable and important.
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have reasoned) is a political office, and under the constitutional scheme,
punishing the President is the responsibility of the overtly political ac-
tors-the Congress and the voters. Because of the awesome responsibil-
ities of his office, the President must often worry about the conse-
quences his actions will have for the country but he should
not-needlessly-bear the additional burden of fearing for personal
consequences to himself. The argument that the President's office and
duties are of such a nature as to render him unique in any constitu-
tional analysis has been made too often to bear repeating here.47 Suffice
it to say that the majority opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald has some of
the flavor of this argument.
48
Thus (so the majority's analysis could run), the judgment that the
President has gone too far, so far that he must be threatened with per-
sonal liability even at the cost of distracting him from his official duties,
is a difficult judgment and an essentially political one. The question
ought to be resolved by the political actors, and that is where the Con-
stitution has wisely placed the express power to check presidential
abuses of authority. If this line of reasoning is what actually underlies
the presidential immunity case, then the decision begins to make a fair
amount of sense and even acquires a certain logical appeal. The line of
reasoning resembles that underlying one strand of the "political ques-
tion" doctrine: the text and structure of the Constitution commit the
decision elsewhere, so the federal courts must keep their hands off.
4 9
That restraint, because it reinforces judicial legitimacy, remains one of
the most powerful arrows in the judicial quiver.
If the preceding two paragraphs fairly state what the majority
47 See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 83 YALE
L.J. 451, 467-70 (1979); Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United
States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 116, 130-40 (1974). The most frequent argument
for presidential uniqueness is the President's status under the constitutional structure.
As Professor Corwin put it: "The Constitution knows only one 'executive power,' that
of the President, whose duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' thus
becomes the equivalent of the duty to and power to execute them himself according to
his own construction of them." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 84
(4th ed. 1957) (emphasis deleted); see also infra note 112 and text accompanying notes
127-30.
48 See 457 U.S. at 757. ("The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the
press," to "[v]igilant oversight by Congress," to "a desire to earn re-election, the need
to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a ...traditional
concern for . . . historical stature.").
'9 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405
U.S. 15 (1972). A plurality of the Court has taken the position that at least some
disputes between the President and Congress should be viewed this way. Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Stevens, JJ.) (right to terminate treaty
nonjusticiable).
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meant, then far from collapsing into a narrow statement of federal com-
mon law, the opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald says something tremen-
dously important: the federal courts lack the power to punish the Presi-
dent at all. For if the courts cannot compel him to pay damages to a
private individual, it is difficult to see how they could force him to pay
damages-in the form of a fine-directly to the court.50 And if the
courts cannot force him to part with his money, they surely could not
order him to jail. Yet those two weapons-deprivation of money and
deprivation of liberty-are the only ones that a court can use to force
compliance with its mandates. Absent those powers, a court may well
issue an injunction or a subpoena, but the court's order may, as Judge
Wilkey put it, turn out to be nothing more than a piece of paper bear-
ing the title.51 That the court's decision may be ignored does not mean
that no process against the President should ever issue; as will become
clear, decision and enforcement are logically separable. The possibility
that the President might simply disregard the judicial will does mean
that if the presidential immunity decision makes a statement about con-
stitutional law, that statement may really be that the federal courts can-
not force the President of the United States to do anything at all.
C. What the Court (Should Have) Said
The conclusion that the federal courts lack authority to punish the
50 One might argue that in the case of a fine for contempt, the Justices are pro-
tecting their own sphere-the judiciary-rather than "merely" defending individual
rights. If one looks through the other end of the telescope, however, one will note that
both cases involve the same issue: can the Court punish the President for doing wrong?
The fact that one wrong is done to an individual and the other to an institution (admit-
tedly a coequal one) does not change the juestion, and there is no immediately appar-
ent reason why it should change the answer.
5' In the original Watergate-related litigation over whether the President was the
proper subject of a subpoena duces tecum-litigation which did not reach the Supreme
Court-the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated
explicitly that the President's legal obligation to obey a court order did not rest on the
court's power to enforce it:
That the Impeachment Clause may qualify the court's power to sanction
non-compliance with judicial orders is immaterial. Whatever the qualifica-
tions, they were equally present in Youngstown. . . . The legality of judi-
cial orders should not be confused with the legal consequences of their
breach; for the courts in this country always assume that their orders will
be obeyed, especially when addressed to responsible government officials.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711-12 (1973) (en banc). The dissent scoffed at this
suggestion, arguing that a subpoena naming a party against whom it could not be
enforced was no more than "a piece of paper captioned 'subpoena.'" Id. at 792
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). The majority opinion adopted the approach advocated here,
treating decision and enforcement as logically distinct.
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President of the United States may at first seem somewhat startling,52
but after a little thought, it makes more sense. One may begin by hy-
pothesizing the contrary. Suppose a court did try to hold the President
of the United States in contempt for disobeying an order addressed to
him. Would federal marshals arrive at the White House, demanding
that the Secret Service agents let them seize the President? Suppose the
President-with the assistance of the security personnel-decided to re-
sist arrest. Aside from a definite air of lese majesty about the whole
thing, there is also the undeniable fact that should matters come to a
showdown, the President has more guns at his command than a federal
court does. The Supreme Court has never pretended otherwise. During
the Reconstruction Era, the Court in Mississippi v. Johnson53 took ex-
plicit note of the difficulties it would encounter in trying to "force" a
President to comply with an order,5" and dismissed a complaint against
President Andrew Johnson.55 Earlier opinions included dicta to similar
effect.56
The mere fact that forcing the President to pay damages might not
be easy does not by itself justify a constitutional rule against trying.57
After all, President Nixon did turn over the Watergate tapes, even
though the federal courts probably could not have enforced a contempt
citation against him.58 Besides, resistance to judicial decrees is hardly
52 The usual rule is quite the contrary: even claims of fundamental right are no
defense in a contempt proceeding for ignoring an injunction. See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The thrust of the presidential immunity decision
(and of this Article as well) is that when it comes to court orders, the President is a
special case. I am grateful to Robert Cover for reminding me that the courts frown on
claims of a "right" to ignore their orders.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
See id. at 500-01: "[Ilt is needless to observe that the court is without power to
enforce its process."
11 Mississippi v. Johnson constituted an attempt to file a suit in the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to enjoin the President from carrying out certain of the
Reconstruction Acts. Consequently, Mississippi v. Johnson might be distinguishable
from a case like Nixon v. Fitzgerald because the former involved a suit against the
President for performance of a mere ministerial act. See Karst & Horowitz, Presiden-
tial Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 UCLA L. REv. 47, 50-51 (1974) (suggesting
this limited construction).
5 Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476-78 (1793) (dictum) (sover-
eign immunity derives from ability to resist judicial process).
51 If the mere possibility of presidential resistance sufficed to trigger presidential
immunity, it would not be easy to draw lines between the President and his subordi-
nates, many of whom could also-especially with presidential assistance-resist the or-
ders of a court. As will become clear, the President's power is important, but something
more is required before immunity is appropriate. There is a distinction, moreover, be-
tween judicial restraint and judicial cowardice, a distinction discussed in greater detail
infra, text accompanying notes 161-69.
" President Nixon's decision to yield the tapes need not be read as an acknowl-
edgement of judicial authority. He may simply have been bowing to political reality.
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new. 9 Had the President not decided to send troops to Little Rock in
the wake of Cooper v. Aaron, ° the schools in that city might be segre-
gated to this day."' The Court's inability to enforce its order without
the assistance of the executive branch did not mean that the Justices
had no power to issue the order. Thus the claim that the Court lacks
power to punish the President must be defended on some ground other
than the Court's lack of enforcement power.
In supporting its conclusion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the majority
focused on what it considered the public policy reasons militating in
favor of an immunity rule. Justice White's dissent at least showed that
these arguments have two sides.6 2 The malleability of public policy ar-
guments makes the majority's reasoning suspect, but need not vitiate
the result. In order to tie its decision more closely to the Constitution,
the Court could have relied on something other than public policy.
Before suggesting some justifications that, although available, were
absent from the majority opinion, it is useful to pause and recall what
the case did not involve.6" The Court was not required to construe the
Constitution's "open-ended" provisions protecting individual rights
against government abuse. The dilemma whether to read those clauses
as though the Constitution were a statute-or perhaps a contract-or
to take them as invitations to import extra-constitutional values moti-
vates much contemporary scholarship on constitutional theory."
See infra note 113.
5 Historic incidents of resistance are collected in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 140-50 (1980).
60 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
61 The text may be a bit unfair; times have changed. The unanswered question
remains one of chicken and egg-is integration more widely accepted because the courts
have been successful in ordering it, or have the courts succeeded in ordering it because
it is more widely accepted?
12 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 792-97 (White, J., dissenting) (attacking
the majority's "public policy" approach). See also Note, supra note 8, at 231 ("Far
from supporting Justice Powell's result, considerations of public policy point toward a
grant of qualified, not absolute, presidential immunity").
13 It is also useful to pause and recall that an argument that the presidential im-
munity decision could have been more powerfully reasoned is not the same as an argu-
ment that the case was rightly (or wrongly) decided. Constitutional theorists seek con-
stitutional theory, in "good" decisions as well as in "bad" ones. The search for a theory
to undergird the result in Nixon v. Fitzgerald is necessary, both to learn whether it can
be harmonized with past decisions and to try to discern what messages it might carry
for future ones.
" Although citations for this point would probably be a bit gratuitous, some of the
major currents in this muddy river might be discerned through a perusal of the widely
divergent views expressed in the following four recent works: R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
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Happily, determining whether a reasoned constitutional basis ex-
ists for the presidential immunity decision does not require wading into
the midst of that scholarly battle. Whatever the best approach to the
adjudication of claims under the clauses protecting individual rights
(and it is not at all clear that there need be only one), there is no
apparent reason to believe that the same interpretive approach ought to
apply to other constitutional provisions.6 5 Different sections of the doc-
ument have different purposes and interpreting each in light of its pur-
pose will probably lead to drastically different approaches. Thus, it is
one thing to look to extra-constitutional sources in deciding what rights
are "retained by the People"66 or incorporated in the phrase "Privileges
or Immunities; ' 67 it is something else altogether to do so when consid-
ering whether federal courts can, for example, review a presidential
decision to cast a veto-or whether the President is a proper defendant
in a suit seeking civil damages.
Provisions describing the functions and powers of the government
may demand a different interpretive approach from provisions describ-
ing the rights of the people. A strict textual approach, focusing on the
understanding of the Framers, may be a more sensible method to use in
interpreting the structural clauses of the Constitution.68 Whether it is a
more sensible method will be examined in the next few pages. If the
strict textual approach does make more sense, then the majority's pub-
lic policy analysis is probably inadequate to justify a constitutional rule
of immunity. It is therefore necessary to consider other possible justifi-
cations for the presidential immunity decision.
" Professor Ely has implied (although he probably didn't mean it) that constitu-
tional theorists should develop a single theory to explain adjudication under the entire
Constitution. See J. ELY, supra note 64, at 41 n.* ("the Constitution is not divided into
two sets of provisions, precise and open-ended"). In truth, some provisions of the Con-
stitution, such as the requirement that the President be thirty-five years of age, are
indeed more precise than others, such as the equal protection clause. Ely is apparently
prepared to concede this disparity. See id. at 13 ("Constitutional provisions exist on a
spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured"). Al-
though Ely devotes much of his book to suggesting a single approach, it is not at all
clear why a single approach is needed to explain all of the document's provisions, pre-
cise, open-ended, and merely muddy.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8 On the other hand, it may not. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Origi-
nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 237 n.124 (1980) ("Analytically and norma-
tively, I see no essential differences among the various areas of constitutional concern
that would automatically insulate any of them from the possibility of nonoriginalist
decisionmaking"); Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What
Price Purity?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 335, 337-38 (1981) (debate over best means of consti-
tutional interpretation includes "major provisions regarding the. . . allocation [of] gov-
ernment power" when they are "quite general in [their] scope and delphic or ambigu-
ous in [their] language").
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1. The Original Understanding Approach
As a general rule, scholars frown on attempts to construe the Con-
stitution by surveying the opinions of the eighteenth-century gentlemen
who wrote it and voted on its ratification. 9 The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, rarely permits a constitutional case to go by without dis-
cussing the "original understanding.17 0 The original understand-
ing-when one can be discerned-is more likely to be important in a
case involving the system of checks and balances than it is in a case
involving individual rights. The reason should be obvious. In protecting
individuals against government mistreatment, those who drafted the
1787 Constitution and its amendments took pains to use language so
broad as fairly to beg to be filled with substantive content from external
sources. They used words sparingly, an approach that makes sense
when one begins with a conception of rights as broad and government
power as narrow. 71 In structuring the government, however, the draft-
ers set themselves rather a different task and used dramatically differ-
ent language.
The 1787 Constitution set forth with painstaking attention to de-
tail the powers and functions of the federal government. Despite a few
glaring errors,72 the document reflects an obsessive concern for the mi-
nutiae of government operation. Words were used cautiously so as to
'9 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1962); J. ELY,
supra note 64, at 11-41; M. PERRY, supra note 64, at 20-24, 61-72; Brest, supra note
68; Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77
COLuM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).
70 But cf. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
119 (asserting that the Justices use history badly because they twist it in order to sup-
port the results that they desire). See also Professor Laycock's stinging evaluation of the
work of Raoul Berger (perhaps the most prolific contemporary advocate of paying close
attention to the original understanding), quoted infra note 79.
71 See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 (1969); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in Amer-
ican Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
72 A good example concerns the role of the Vice President. The Vice President
serves as President of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. When the President of the
United States is tried in the Senate following impeachment by the House of Represent-
atives, the Chief Justice of the United States presides. Id. That is the only provision in
the Constitution requiring the Vice President to turn over the gavel to another individ-
ual. Yet the Vice President himself is also impeachable, and if impeached by the
House, he would be tried in the Senate. It appears, therefore, that the Vice President
could preside at his own impeachment trial, should he choose to do so.
7' This "obsession" with detail is only comparative. Few words in the document
are used in defining the rights of the people. Many are used in explaining the opera-
tion of government. The details set forth in the Constitution often give inadequate guid-
ance for the operation of the modern activist state, the rise of which the Framers could
not, of course, have anticipated. See note 199 infra. That their obsession did not pro-
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leave little room for interpretation. Thus although some wanted to
make the President impeachable for any reason, the delegates in Phila-
delphia finally voted to limit impeachable offenses to "Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,' 7 4 in the hope of limiting
congressional power over him.75 The Constitution also does not include
a requirement that members of the House of Representatives be "ma-
ture"-although maturity emerged as a major concern in the de-
bates 7 -but only that they be at least twenty-five years old.7 One can
duce perfect prescience does not mean that the obsession did not exist.
74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
11 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 550 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS]. The Committee of Eleven had recommended limiting
impeachment to cases of treason or bribery. Mason responded that many abuses of
power would not fall within those narrow categories, and suggested the substitution of
"maladministration." But Madison, who drafted the phrase "high crimes and misde-
meanors," argued that Mason's proposal was "[s]o vague a term" that it would "be
equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate." Madison's phrasing was
adopted. Id. For a concise summary of the contemporary debate over which offenses
ought to be impeachable, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 430-31 (10th ed. 1980).
7" Madison's notes on the Convention recite the following:
Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty five years of age as a qualifica-
tion for the members of the 1st branch". He thought it absurd that a man
today should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great na-
tion. It was the more extraordinary as every man carried with him in his
own experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of young politicians;
since he would if interrogated be obliged to declare that his political opin-
ions at the age of 21 were too crude and erroneous to merit an influence
on public measures. It had been said that Congs. had proved a good school
for our young men. It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were, he
chose that they should bear the expense of their own education.
1 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 375. James Wilson challenged the assumption that the
young were immature: "Many instances might be mentioned of signal services rendered
in high stations to the public before the age of 25." Id. The motion to make twenty-five
the minimum age nevertheless carried by a vote of seven states to three, with one dele-
gation undecided.
A similar reduction of vague qualifications to a term of years appears in Tench
Coxe's pseudonymous discussions of the President and members of the Senate, pub-
lished in a Pennsylvania newspaper during the ratification debates under the byline
"An American Citizen." Of the President, Coxe wrote:
[H]e cannot be an idiot, probably not a knave or a tyrant, for those whom
nature makes so, discover it before the age of thirty-five, until which pe-
riod he cannot be elected. . . .Our President must be matured by the
experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five
must be fully understood.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 140-41
(M. Jensen ed. 1976) (emphasis deleted) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY]. Coxe noted of Senators: "No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced youth
can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth or most power-
ful connections, till thirty years have ripened his abilities and fully discovered his merits
to his country ... " Id. at 143 (emphasis deleted).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 131:1341
HeinOnline -- 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358 1982-1983
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
imagine a Constitution providing that elected representatives be "ma-
ture" or "of good character," but there is something disturbing, per-
haps counterintuitive, about such provisions, as there would be about a
provision for congressional overriding of the President's veto "by an
extraordinary majority," unless the provision specified what the major-
ity must be. These hypothetical provisions seem counterintuitive for a
good reason, and that good reason probably explains their absence from
the Constitution: in determining such matters as the qualifications for
elected officials, the Framers were structuring a government, not setting
forth rights. In the Framers' view, the former called for more precise
language than did the latter. The precise wording of the structural pro-
visions reflects an effort to define the structure of government carefully
and circumscribe the powers of government narrowly. This purpose
should not be ignored when construing the structural provisions of the
Constitution.
It therefore makes sense to try to determine the way that the
Framers hoped that the Presidency would be controlled. The hopes of
the Framers may not be decisive and certainly should not be relied on
when they contradict the textual language,79 but they can shed light on
the proper operation of the system of checks and balances. Naturally,
the Framers were rarely, if ever, unanimous, and even a consensus
would be difficult to establish. Anyone who claims to have found une-
quivocal agreement should be treated with the degree of respect that
argument deserves. Justice Powell was surely correct, however, when
he wrote for the majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that "historical evi-
8 The argument that the original understanding sheds light because of the nature
of the clauses under analysis should be distinguished from the argument that the origi-
nal understanding matters because the Framers wanted it to. The latter argument is a
tautology that has properly been labeled "anomalous." See Kay, Preconstitutional
Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 193 n.22 (1981).
79 Compare the following critique of the work of Raoul Berger on the fourteenth
amendment:
[N]o amount of legislative history can change the meaning of the text as
extensively as some would wish. Professor Berger assures us that the in-
tention of the Framers is "as good as written into the text," by which he
means "substituted for the text." Had the fourteenth amendment said,
"Never hurt black Southerners," he would not let that bar an argument
from legislative history to show that it really meant "Always help white
Northerners." Legislative history cannot perform such feats. It can clarify
ambiguities, indicate central concerns, and cast light on whether cases near
the limits of the language were meant to be included. But it cannot do
what Berger requires of it ...
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 343, 351-52 (1981) (footnotes omitted) (review of J. ELY, supra note 64).
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dence must be weighed as well as cited.""0 The majority weighed the
evidence and concluded that the original understanding lent some sup-
port, but not too much, to its argument."' In truth, the majority could
have made more of the history than it did. The great weight of the
historical evidence suggests the existence of a consensus at the time of
ratification to the effect that those checks on presidential abuse of
power expressly set forth in the document were the only checks
available.8 2
This consensus emerges from the nature of the disputes among the
drafters and ratifiers over the proper functions and powers of the Presi-
dent. The intense debate surrounding the Presidency induced the
Framers to define their views with rare precision. Those who favored a
loose confederation of quasi-independent states argued that the Presi-
dent was too strong and not sufficiently accountable for wrongdoing;8
80 457 U.S. at 752 n.31. I:
81 In a lengthy historical footnote, the majority cites the following evidence: (1)
concerns expressed at the Constitutional Convention that even impeachment might be
too great a burden on the President; (2) the total absence of suggestions at that time
that personal damages liability was contemplated; and (3) various remarks in the early
years of the Constitution. Explicitly recognizing the "fragmentary" character of these
sources, Justice Powell's footnote goes on to add that "the most compelling arguments
arise" not from the history, but from the structure of the Constitution. Id.
82 The word "consensus" is used here in a quasi-scientific sense. "Consensus"
does not connote unanimity, but rather a common understanding reflected in the shared
views of an overwhelming majority. The majority view may be wrong, but even those
in the minority will generally concede that the majority view exists. See M. WESSEL,
SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 142-44 (1980); J. ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN
ExPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE 88-92, 124-26 (1978). Thus
the mere existence of a handful of contemporaneous statements arguably to the contrary
does not defeat the notion that a consensus existed, as long as the primary evidence is
concrete and powerful. This approach to the original understanding is close to, but not
quite the same as, what Professor Brest calls "moderate originalism." Brest, supra note
68, at 231-34.
83 Some delegates made statements to this effect at the Constitutional Convention,
but the argument arose far more frequently and powerfully after the document was
submitted to the states for ratification. For statements at the Convention, see, e.g. 1
RECORDS, supra note 75, at 101 (J. Mason) ("We are not indeed constituting a British
Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one"). Arguments during the
ratification debates are set forth at, e.g., 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 76, at
374 (Newspaper correspondent argues that President would be "vested with the powers
of [a] King"); 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 314 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (J. Lincoln) ("impossible"
to remove the President "without another revolution") [hereinafter cited as DEBATES];
3 id. at 165-66 (P. Henry) ("Can you search the President's closet? Is this a real
check?"); id. at 219 (J. Monroe) ("I can see no real checks [on the President] in it");
id. at 491 (W. Grayson) (impeachment inadequate as sole remedy, because President
and Senators may be "partners in crime"). See generally Kenyon, Men of Little Faith:
The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, in THE CONFEDER-
ATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CRITICAL ISSUES 56, 72-74 (G. Wood ed.
197-3).
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those who thought the central government should be strong argued that
the President was too weak, that he was subject to too many controls
and potential punishments to be able to do his job properly."4 Support-
ers of the Constitution had ready responses to each objection.
The President was not too strong, supporters contended, because
he was subject to several specific checks on abuses of his authority."'
The supporters always listed the checks appearing in the document: the
power of the purse rested with Congress, the President could be im-
peached, his veto could be overridden, he could make no appointments
or treaties without Senate consent, he was subject to reelection every
four years.8 6 Hamilton went to great lengths in The Federalist to as-
sure the worried public that these provisions were adequate to control
presidential misconduct.8 7 At the same time, Hamilton and other sup-
'4 For examples of this argument during the Philadelphia Convention, see, e.g., 1
RECORDS, supra note 75, at 98 (J. Wilson) (if veto is not absolute, "the Legislature
can at any moment sink [the executive] into non-existence"); 2 id. at 64-65 (G. Mason)
("impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will render the Execu-
tive dependent on those who are to impeach"). In the Pennsylvania ratification process,
all but two of the delegates voting against ratification signed a minority report charg-
ing, among other things, that the strength of the Senate "will destroy all independency
and purity in the executive department." DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 76, at
635. Similar arguments persisted throughout the debates. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra
note 83, at 117 (S. Spencer) (combination of impeachment and veto powers renders
Chief Executive helpless). Some of these complaints, however, might be dismissed as
sour grapes, in light of the preference of some Federalists for a monarchy. See generally
G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 205; Krauel, Prince Henry of Prussia and the Regency of
the United States, 1786, 17 AM. HIST. REV. 44 (1911). During the presidencies of
George Washington and John Adams, a quasi-monarchical conception of the presi-
dency may have attained broad popular acceptance. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 17 (rev. ed. 1957). In fact, Washington (who no one
doubted would be the first President) is said to have preferred the title "His High
Mightiness, the President of the United States and Protector of their Liberties." M.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 163
(1913).
" See, e.g., 2 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 200-01 (R. Law) (popular election will
"secure" the people from "oppression"); 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 76, at
527 (R. Sherman) (similar); 3 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 486 (E. Randolph) ("If he
be not impeached, he may be displaced at the end of the four years"); 4 id. at 122 (W.
Davie) ("impossible for human ingenuity to devise any mode of election better calcu-
lated to exclude undue influence"): id. at 32 (U. Iredell) (impeachment renders Presi-
dent "amenable for his conduct"); id. at 281 (C. Pinckney) (abuses of power "effectu-
ally checked" because "[n]o man, however great, is exempt from impeachment and
trial").
86 See supra note 85. The Framers expected that the desire for reelection would
serve as one of the most important checks on presidential abuse of his authority. They
did not reckon on advancing technology that would permit implementation of presiden-
tial decisions in a relatively short period of time. They also did not foresee the adoption
of the twenty-second amendment.
87 [The President] is to be elected forfour years; and is to be reeligible
as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their
confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between
1983]
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porters of ratification repeatedly warned that no additional checks
should be permitted, lest the President become too weak.88
The Constitution's supporters made, with slightly different em-
phasis, the same argument to those who thought the Constitution made
the executive too weak. In reassuring those who feared presidential
weakness, supporters emphasized that the limitations actually stated in
the Constitution were the only limitations placed on the President, and
these, the opponents were assured, would not impair the President's
ability to do his job.89 Some provision -had to be made against the possi-
him and a king of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing
the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever....
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached,
tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of
the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitu-
tional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can
be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution ...
The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill,
which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsider-
ation; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsider-
ation it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great
Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two
houses of Parliament. . . .The qualified negative of the President differs
widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign ...
THE FEDERALIST No. 69 at 444-45 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
" See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 315 (C. Pinckney) (arguing against
alterations in President's term of office); id. at 74 (J. Iredell) (explaining why Presi-
dent must have veto). This was all part of a larger effort by supporters of ratification to
avoid any changes in the carefully crafted system of checks and balances.
For example, an anonymous newspaper article in New Jersey insisted that "every
guard which can be reasonably required seems to be made against improper encroach-
ment." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 148-49. A New York delegate
warned his state's ratifying convention: "We may render useless all our provisions for
security by urging and straining them too far: we may apply checks which have a direct
tendency to impede the most salutary operations of the government, and ultimately
deprive it of the strength and vigor necessary to preserve our national freedom." 2
DEBATES, supra note 83, at 297 (G. Morris). New York Chancellor Robert Livingston
agreed, suggesting that those who wanted to add additional limitations "would multiply
checks till the new government was as relaxed and nerveless as the old one." Id. at 323.
Added Rawlin Lowndes in the South Carolina Convention: "[T]oo many checks in a
political machine must produce the same mischief as in a mechanical one-that of
throwing all into confusion." 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 309.
89 James Wilson'in particular told the Pennsylvania ratification convention that
he had expected only the charge that the President was too powerful, not the charge
that he was not powerful enough. 2 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 510-11. "I do not
mean to insinuate that he has more powers than he ought to have," Wilson added, "but
merely to declare that they are of such a nature as to place him above expression of
contempt." Id. at 512-13. John Adams, an influential Federalist who would later be-
come the first Vice President and the second President, asserted that even with all the
checks spelled out in the document, the power of the Chief Executive "during those
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bility of presidential tyranny, supporters pointed out, and the drafters
had done the best they could without limiting the Chief Executive's
powers too greatly.90
There is no reason to belabor this; attempts to piece together an
original "understanding" from the fragments of history tend to end up
looking silly.91 What is rather startling in this instance is that the same
questions and answers occur again and again in the surviving records.
That is why it may be safe to assume that a consensus existed. At the
very least, it cannot fairly be asserted that the history points in some
other direction. 2
four years is much greater than that of an avoyer, a consul, a podesta, a doge, a stadt-
holder; nay, than a king of Poland; nay, than a king of Sparta." G. WOOD, supra note
71, at 586 (quoting Adams). See also THE FEDERALiST Nos. 73, 74 & 75 (A. Hamil-
ton) (Chief Executive retains vigor in spite of checks on him).
0 During a discussion of impeachment at the Constitutional Convention, delegate
after delegate rose to defend this check. William Davie suggested that if the President
"be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get
himself re-elected." 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 64. Without the remedy of impeach-
ment, George Mason said, the Chief Executive would be "above Justice." Id. at 65.
James Madison asserted that impeachment was necessary because it was "indispensa-
ble that some provision should be made for defending the Community ag[ainst] the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate," who could otherwise freely
"pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression" or "betray his
trust to foreign powers." Id. at 65-66. Edmund Randolph added that without impeach-
ment, "no regular punishment" would exist should the President abuse his powers. Id.
at 67. And Benjamin Franklin commented wryly that without impeachment, recourse
might be had to assassination, in which event the President would be "not only de-
prived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character." Id. at 65. It was
on the strength of these arguments that the Convention voted overwhilmingly to retain
the remedy of impeachment and removal from office. Similarly, in his state's ratifying
convention, James Iredell warned that without the congressional power of impeach-
ment, the President would know "that there is no tribunal to punish him" for "miscon-
duct" and therefore he "may be ready to deviate from his duty ... " 4 DEBATES,
supra note 83, at 32.
*1 Or, at least, piecing together the original understanding may seem silly from a
lawyer's point of view; lawyers generally think that only evidence that is clear and
convincing "proves" a point. Historians are accustomed to operating at a lower level of
confidence, and good historians willingly express a concomitantly higher level of doubt
as to their conclusions. The text's suggestion that a consensus probably existed is cer-
tainly open to attack. That the same pattern of questions and answers was repeated so
often in the debates over the Constitution, however, remains remarkable. The consistent
pattern does not "prove" that a consensus existed, but it certainly places the burden of
persuasion on the other side.
92 Justice White's valiant effort to do so in his Nixon v. Fitzgerald dissent comes
close but falls short. First, Justice White quotes the governor of North Carolina's
speech to his state's ratification convention to the effect that an officer who is liable to
impeachment may, if he "commits an offense against an individual" be "amenable to
the courts of law." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 774 (quoting 4 DEBATES, supra
note 83, at 48 (S. Johnston)). The governor's comment, however, came in response to a
hypothetical case involving an inferior officer engaged in ministerial duties. See 4 DE-
BATES, supra note 83, at 46-48 (A. Maclaine). Consequently, it does not bear on pun-
ishment of the President, who was treated throughout the debates as a special case.
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2. The Structural Approach
The Constitution's relatively precise clauses describing the opera-
tion of the federal government are designed to fit together to form a
coherent structure. This purpose distinguishes them from the open-en-
ded clauses, many of which were designed to address particular
problems and bear little relation to the other parts of the document. By
careful attention to the structure of the system of checks and balances
created by the more precise clauses, the majority could have tied its
opinion more closely to the Constitution.
The system of checks and balances is a delicate one, and the Con-
stitution sets forth with some degree of care the checks that each branch
may apply to the others. Thus the President may nominate and, if the
Senate consents, appoint Justices to the Supreme Court and judges to
the lower federal courts,93 but only Congress, through impeachment
Justice White quotes another North Carolina delegate: "Were it possible to suppose
that the President should give wrong instructions to his deputies, whereby the citizens
would be distressed, they would have redress in the ordinary courts of common law."
457 U.S. at 774-75 (quoting 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 47 (A. Maclaine)). This
remark, however, occurred in the cotirse of the hypothetical that gave rise to Governor
Johnston's comment quoted above. The context makes plain that Maclaine was refer-
ring to the proper forum for relief, not to the proper defendant. Nothing in the presi-
dential immunity decision is to the contrary; the only issue is whether the defendants in
this hypothetical case would be the President and his aides or his aides alone. See infra
notes 208-19 and accompanying text. On that point, Maclaine's comment gives no clue.
Justice White next quotes Wilson, who told the Pennsylvania convention that "far
from being above the laws, [the President] is amenable to them in his private character
as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. at 775 (quoting 2 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 480). If other significant evidence
supported Justice White's construction of this comment, the comment might be taken to
stand for the proposition for which he cites it. By itself-or more precisely, against the
historical backdrop discussed supra text accompanying notes 72-91-it only suggests
that when the President does a purely private wrongful act (failure to pay income tax,
for example), he violates the law. Wilson's comment hardly suggests the appropriate
remedy, and it says nothing at all about prospective civil liability when the President
acts in a public character but abuses his powers. See supra note 43. Finally, Justice
White consigns to a footnote what is probably the strongest evidence in support of his
historical understanding: a pseudonymous essay by Tench Coxe in which he states that
the person of the President "is not so much protected as that of a member of the House
of Representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary
course of law." 457 U.S. at 774 n.14 (quoting 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
76, at 141) (emphasis in the original). That quotation represents one of those pieces of
evidence in which a historian can find whatever he may be looking for. The quotation
could refer to civil damages liability, but in light of the historical context more likely
refers either to proceedings after impeachment (because the speech or debate clause's
protection of a member of Congress can never be removed) or to the opinion of a single
essayist. When balanced against the apparent consensus that no other checks existed
but those set forth plainly in the document, the quotation cannot carry too much
weight.
93 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
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and conviction, may remove them. 4 Congress may propose legislation
(including legislation channeling the President's discretion), 5 but ab-
sent extraordinary majorities in both Houses, the proposals do not be-
come law if the President objects." Congress may go through the mo-
tions of enacting legislation that violates the Constitution, but the
federal courts, in a case properly brought, may strike those statutes
down.97 Congress holds exclusive power of the purse,98 and Congress
alone can impeach the President and remove him from office.99 A few
other checks, mostly in the form of congressional powers, are scattered
through the document.100 In addition, because all members of Congress
as well as the President are elected, popular sentiment provides a pow-
erful and constant check on the operation of the entire system.101
Outside the interplay of these powers, the Constitution provides no fur-
ther express controls on misconduct.
As American society has evolved, powerful arguments have arisen
that other checks-checks for which the Constitution makes no appar-
ent provision-ought to be applied against any one of the three
branches in order to control its growing power. New remedies insti-
Id. art. I, § 3 (implying that anyone holding "any office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States" may be subject to impeachment and trial). See R. BER-
GER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-65 (1973).
, Although the modem Supreme Court has occasionally intervened when con-
gressional supervision of the other branches has been too close, see, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (congressional usurpation of some executive responsibilities),
Congress has generally been able to curtail executive discretion, through direct legisla-
tion, see, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (Congress may force the
executive branch to spend money).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (power to declare laws
unconstitutional may be implied from constitutional structure).
98 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
" Id. art. I, § 2 (House has sole impeachment power); id. art. I, § 3 (Senate has
sole power to try impeachments). After impeachment and removal, the President is
"liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law." Id: Arguably, because it removes any possible separation of powers defense to a
criminal proceeding, impeachment would also strip the President of his immunity from
civil damages liability.
100 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8 (Congress may declare war); id. art. II, § 2 (Senate
must approve treaties and major appointments); id. art. V (as construed in Hollings-
worth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)) (President has no role in constitutional
amendment process).
101 See id. art. I, § 2 (members of House elected by public every two years); id.
art. I, § 3, amended by amend. XVII (members of Senate elected by public every six
years); id. art. II, § 1 (President and Vice President elected every four years). Because
members of the House serve the shortest terms, public pressure on them may be greater
than that on Senators and on the President. If so, members of the House might forge
that additional pressure into a club to hold over the Senate and the Executive Branch.
For some of the ways in which public opinion might influence the Justices of the
Supreme Court, see infra notes 158 & 170 and text accompanying notes 158-70.
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tuted by Congress included statutes restricting the President's power to
remove executive branch functionaries. The first such statutes were
struck down, but later versions were sustained. 102 A more recent exam-
ple of an attempt to restrict the presidency was the congressional crea-
tion of the "legislative veto," through which Congress attempted to in-
fluence day-to-day policymaking in the executive branch and in the
administrative agencies without affording the President an opportunity
to exercise his constitutional prerogative by casting a veto.103 If the
presidency has become "imperial" 1°4 and if none of the existing re-
straints seems sufficient to rein in whatever maniac might then be occu-
pying the Oval Office, the idea of creating a new remedy has a certain
appeal. But in entrusting to any one branch of government the author-
ity to create new checks on one or both of the others, the proponent of
the new check is inviting one branch to act unilaterally to alter the
delicate balance that the Constitution creates. At the risk of sounding
melodramatic, those who advocate the creation of new checks are, how-
ever unintentionally, ultimately seeking to subvert the balance of pow-
ers in order to save it. It is difficult to see how the checks built into the
structural provisions of the Constitution will retain their intended force
if they are not tempered by a continuing balance.
The balance of powers among the three branches of the federal
government is a delicate construct, and if any one of the branches is
empowered to create new checks on the others that branch will be in
the position to upset the very balance that it purports to protect. Thus
the system requires placing the narrowest possible reading on the au-
thority of each branch of government to act in the name of preserving
that system.105 Attention to the original understanding and a strict view
102 Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (removal power may not
be restricted) with Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (re-
moval power may be restricted). Humphrey's Executor is widely viewed as having
"constitutionalized" the independent administrative agencies as a "fourth branch" of
government, but consideration of their role in the system of checks and balances is
beyond the scope of this Article.
103 The Supreme Court has ruled that the legislative veto is generally unconstitu-
tional. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 194-202); Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers' Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). A good argument can be made,
however, that the legislative veto contained in the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, is constitutional even after Chadha, because of the
unique status of the congressional war power. See Carter, The Constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984).
104 See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2 (arguing that office of President has grown
too strong).
105 A proposal analogous to that which the text disapproves has been made by
Professor Calabresi in his Holmes Lectures. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Somewhat simplified, Calabresi's approach would per-
[Vol. 131:1341
HeinOnline -- 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1366 1982-1983
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
of constitutional language are both merely means to the end of main-
taining the balance of power among the branches of the federal
government.
D. What What the Court Should Have Said Would Have Meant
The arguments set out above are arguments that the majority
could have made, but failed to make in any detail, in support of the
theory that the decision is constitutionally based. The arguments share
a simple conclusion: in .determining the role that each branch should
play in the system of checks and balances, all judgments on proper pol-
icy must be subordinated to the most important policy, preserving that
selfsame system of checks and balances. Permitting one branch to create
fresh remedies will upset the balance. Anything that upsets the balance
is wrong.10 6 That is why the federal courts cannot create a cause of
mit "common law courts ... to treat statutes in precisely the same way that they treat
the common law." Id. at 82. "[S]imply living with anachronistic statutes," he writes,
"is not really an option." Id. at 110. Calabresi's approach would not violate the Consti-
tution, he explains, because:
[The doctrine of separation of powers] asks us to consider the roles our
institutions must play if we are to maintain that balance established by
our governmental system. Judicial power to force legislative reconsidera-
tion of statutes serves precisely to maintain the balance between the tradi-
tional court role of keeping the fabric of the law consistent and up to date
and the legislative role of reversing judicial misperceptions of majoritarian
demands, while responding quickly to the constitutionally valid needs of
special groups. As such it is, in a fundamental sense, fully consistent with
the traditional balance of power imposed by our constitutions.
Id. at 116. Calabresi's proposal does indeed ask one branch to use an unusual remedy
(Calabresi argues at length that it is not really a "new" one) to shore up perceived
deficiencies in the system of checks and balances. As will become clear, however, that
does not necessarily make it constitutionally infirm under the theory advanced in the
text. Extraordinary necessity might excuse what would otherwise be an arrogation of
power. See infra text accompanying notes 134-73. Moreover, Calabresi also suggests
that legislative approval (which might be .withdrawn at any time) would be necessary
before courts could exercise the power he recommends. Id. at 117. Were the legislature
expressly to delegate this authority to the courts while retaining political control-the
right to renege-then this essay's warnings might not be violated. The principles of
separation of powers may also present less of a bar when two branches of government
cooperate than when they compete for power. See, e.g., Miller, An Inquiry into the
Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 589-92 (1973). The question
is not easy and this answer remains vague and unsatisfactory.
'" This assertion raises the problem of what to do when something does happen
to upset the balance of powers. Suppose one branch of government, as a result of its
own misconduct, the lassitude of the other branches, or simple cultural evolution, grad-
ually increases its freedom of action, to the detriment of the other two. If the necessity
for fresh remedies proves great enough, a good argument might be made in this narrow
circumstance, the principle set forth in text should be altered. Is that an exception so
vast that it would engulf the rule? That depends on the way the "necessity" criterion is
defined and applied. See infra text accompanying notes 134-73.
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action for damages running against a President or former President on
the basis of misconduct in office.
Had it explained Nixon v. Fitzgerald that way, the Court would
presumably have gone on to explain why the theory that all other inter-
ests must be subordinated to the need to preserve the system of checks
and balances does not do violence to precedent. A distinction must be
drawn between the two very different roles the federal courts play in
the system of checks and balances. To paraphrase Felix Frankfurter,
when the courts settle a dispute between the two more overtly political
branches, they act as "referees at prize fights;" but when they act af-
firmatively to vindicate an individual claim of right against a represen-
tative of another branch, they act as "functionaries of justice."""7 In
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, an individual asked the Court to make him whole,
and the Justices hesitated. The majority's reasoning suggests constitu-
tional limitations on the judicial power to act as functionaries of justice
by creating fresh remedies. Nothing in the decision is inconsistent with
the cases in which the Court has acted as a referee. 08
United States v. Nixon109 does not fall squarely into either cate-
gory, but it is probably best viewed as a "court-as-referee" decision.
The Justices were not settling a dispute between the other two
branches, but they were also not protecting the rights of any individual
against government excess. The Court was called upon instead to act as
referee within a particular branch of government.'" The Court ac-
107 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
lo8 If the presidential immunity case means that the judiciary is more hesitant to
protect individual rights when the Constitution is said to bar relief than it is to inter-
vene in disputes between the other branches of government, one recent proposal on the
limits of judicial review is in trouble. Professor Choper suggests that the federal courts
should stay out of disputes between the political branches (the Separation Proposal), J.
CHOPER, supra note 59, at 263, but ought to act to protect individual rights (the Indi-
vidual Rights Proposal), id. at 66-68. Part of the problem is that questions of these
types are not rigorously separable. Nixon v. Fitzgerald raised an individual rights issue
with separation of powers implications. The case could be viewed as asking the Court
only to make the plaintiff whole, but it could also be viewed as asking the Justices to
perform the arguably legislative function of punishing the President. If the case is ap-
proached without preconceptions, it is difficult to find a principled reason to argue that
the case falls strictly within either the Separation Proposal or the Individual Rights
Proposal.
Under the Separation Proposal, moreover, the constitutionality of the legislative
veto should have been treated as a nonjusticiable political question. See id. at 357-60.
The Court, however, expressly rejected this approach in Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 (1983).
09 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11 Acting as a referee within a particular branch is a power that the Court exer-
cised previously in 1969 when it issued its controversial decision in Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), invalidating a congressional attempt to exclude a member
on grounds other than the "Qualifications" that the Court said are set forth expressly
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cepted the task, and its resolution of the dispute required the President
to comply with an order. The result in Nixon v. Fitzgerald suggests
that had the President defied the Court's order in United States v.
Nixon, the Justices would not have created a fresh remedy through
which to try and punish him.111 The risk of presidential defiance, how-
ever, although much bandied-about at the time, was probably close to
nil. President Nixon was politically helpless and the Justices must have
known that. 2 Had he refused to comply with the Court's "definitive"
decision, he would almost certainly have been impeached and removed
from office. The federal court could not, under the logic of the presi-
dential immunity decision, have acted against him directly, but a pun-
ishment for disobedience would have been imposed all the same. The
order would simply have been enforced by a branch other than the one
that issued it."'
That inability to act against the President directly is hardly incon-
sistent with other cases in which the federal courts have, in evaluating
the legitimacy of presidential actions, evinced reluctance to deal with
the President directly. With rare exception, the courts have reviewed
presidential activities through suits naming as a defendant not the Pres-
ident himself, but some lower executive functionary." The same the-
in the Constitution. In Powell, however, the Justices made explicit what was only im-
plicit in United States v. Nixon: only the force of the Court's legitimacy stood behind
the mandate. Thus, the Court ruled that individual Members of Congress were not
proper defendants. Powell, 395 U.S. at 501-06.
111 See supra note 50 and text accompanying notes 42-51. Alternately, perhaps,
United States v. Nixon need not be harmonized. It may be as Professor Kurland has
suggested, that the case was an aberration, "a political decision not a judicial one."
Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REv. 68, 70
(1974). Explaining away hard cases by calling them aberrations is, however, too easy
an escape from the need for theory. If the decision can be placed on a principled basis,
good; if it cannot, then it was wrongly decided and should be overruled. Cf Black, The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 421 (1960) (making simi-
lar argument with respect to Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)).
"' Nevertheless, the possibility of presidential resistance to the Court's ultimate
decree in United States v. Nixon was hammered home both in pre-argument White
House statements and at oral argument, and the Justices could not have been unaware
of the risks. For a discussion of how this awareness might have affected the Court's
reasoning in its published opinion, see Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Com-
inent on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. Rlv. 76 (1974). A more speculative,
even fanciful, account of the Court's effort to reach a "definitive" decision appears in B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 32, at 287-347.
12 In addition to actions taken by Congress, enforcement was also effected in the
court of public opinion, where President Nixon had already been tried and convicted.
In a sense, as Professors Karst and Horowitz have argued, in turning over the disputed
tapes, President Nixon bowed not to the order of the federal courts, but "to political
reality." Karst & Horowitz, supra note 55, at 53.
114 See supra note 3. This explanation may be compared with Professor Freund's
comment on the concession by plaintiff's counsel in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), that the President might not be a proper subject of mandamus.
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ory-that no punishment question was involved and the courts were
merely acting as referees-may explain these results, but another the-
ory fits them even better. The President was not a defendant, and it is
only to the President himself, with his special place in the constitu-
tional scheme and history, that immunity attaches.115 The Supreme
Court acknowledged as much when, on the same day that it decided the
presidential immunity case, it ruled in Harlow v. Fitzgerald that no
similar immunity attaches to the President's aides."' Because the Pres-
ident almost always acts through his subordinates, a non-immune de-
Wrote Freund: "This concession could be readily made, however, because a practical
alternative existed-the President's subordinate could stand in judgment." Freund, The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARv. L. REv.
13, 19 (1974). Freund went on to suggest that this alternative was not present in
United States v. Nixon:
If members of Congress cannot be sued for their official conduct, still of-
ficers of their house may be answerable for carrying out those actions, as
cabinet officers may be legally accountable for executing presidential di-
rections. This time-honored means of accommodation was made unavaila-
ble in the tapes case by the President's action in formally taking sole cus-
tody of the tapes. Thus the usual suit against a subordinate became
impossible, and a confrontation was compelled.
Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
"' Thus, in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1979), the Court of Appeals ruled that although a contempt citation against the Attor-
ney General was improper in the case sub judice, such a citation might be appropriate
in some other case. The court noted that "the executive responsibilities and constitu-
tional status of the Attorney General do not compare to those of the President," id. at
62, but added:
Although we unequivocally affirm the principle that no person is above
the law, . . . we cannot ignore the fact that a contempt sanction imposed
on the Attorney General in his official capacity has greater public impor-
tance, with separation of power overtones, and warrants more sensitive
judicial scrutiny than such a sanction imposed on an ordinary litigant.
Id. at 64. The panel concluded that "holding the Attorney General of the United States
in contempt to ensure compliance with a court order should be a last resort, to be
undertaken only after all other means to achieve the ends legitimately sought by the
court have been exhausted," id. at 65, and vacated the district court's contempt order
pending the application of less intrusive sanctions. The implication of the court's opin-
ion, however, is clearly that contempt is available against the Attorney General.
A district court in California recently applied a lesser sanction, dismissing a crimi-
nal prosecution at least in part because of the government's refusal to comply with an
order requiring Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese to appear and testify. See United
States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Dismissal was less intrusive than
contempt because dismissal merely ended the judicial role; it did not force any executive
official to do anything. Dismissal was not an available sanction in the case giving rise to
the Second Circuit's opinion, because that case was a civil suit against the United
States. The analogous sanction would be a default judgment against the government.
The distinction between the President and his aides for immunity purposes is fur-
ther discussed infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
"I" See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (discussed infra, text accompa-
nying notes 124-41).
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fendant will generally be available in any case brought to contest the
validity of a presidential directive.117
If the President's aides are not immune from suit as he is, they
may be placed in an uncomfortable position when he orders them to do
something that they believe to be wrong. There is a temptation to say
flippantly that an executive functionary placed in that position may re-
sign, tell his story to the Washington Post, and write a bestselling book.
More seriously, the position may be uncomfortable, but the choice
should not be difficult. The employees of the executive branch work for
the United States of America, not for the person who happens to oc-
cupy the office of President. Faced with an order they believe to be
illegitimate, executive functionaries should state their belief and refuse
to carry the order out. They may be dismissed for that refusal, but they
will have acted in accord with the requirements of the Constitution.'1 I
Just as nothing in the presidential immunity decision is inconsis-
tent with the courts' acting as a functionary of justice in cases involving
non-immune defendants, nothing about the ruling suggests a judicial
inclination to stop acting as referee in many disputes between the Presi-
dent and the Congress. A federal court does not create a forbidden fresh
remedy for misconduct merely because it decides such cases as Myers,119
117 See Professor Freund's comment quoted supra note 114. In his dissent in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 822-29 (1982), Chief Justice Burger argued that
the Court's refusal to grant absolute immunity to the President's aides, on a theory
deriving their immunity directly from the President's own, is inconsistent with earlier
decisions permitting legislative aides to partake derivatively of legislator's immunity.
See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972). The legislative immunity cases need not, however, be read beyond their facts:
those cases may have decided that, in the particular circumstances presented, congres-
sional aides were immune as a matter of law. They need not be read as saying that
congressional aides are always immune. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969) (permitting suit against congressional employees while dismissing members of
Congress as defendants). Even if Harlow v. Fitzgerald cannot be harmonized with the
cases on immunity of congressional employees, that does not compel the conclusion that
Harlow v. Fitzgerald was wrongly decided. Perhaps McMillan and Gravel are the
cases that were wrongly decided.
118 At that point, the dismissed employee might try to sue for backpay. The next
employee up the line might be the proper subject of suit, and so on, until the Oval
Office is reached. The President, of course, would be immune, which might mean that
someone would be without remedy. Whether the plaintiff would really have to go home
emptyhanded is less than clear, though, because (1) another official, perhaps an official
in charge of signing paychecks or filing personnel records, might be brought in as a
defendant, and (2) faced with this enormous rebellion among executive branch employ-
ees, the President, as a practical matter, would surely cave in. If, on the other hand,
someone is indeed left without a remedy, that would not necessarily represent a failure
within the system. See infra note 209.
119 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (provision requiring Senate con-
sent to removal of postmasters held unconstitutional).
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Humphrey's Executor,120 Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices,""1 and Chadha:'2 whether a forbidden remedy is created depends
on the result that is reached. By engaging in judicial review, the courts
are only doing what they have always done: acting as referees and de-
termining the constitutionality of what the other branches are doing.
Deciding cases does not upset the balance of powers but reaching the
wrong decision may. In each case, the primary consideration must be
the preservation of the system of checks and balances. Unless the Jus-
tices are prepared to hold that Congress has broader discretion to for-
mulate new remedies than the Court does (a proposition not impossible
to support),1 25 the Justices should rule against the validity of the new
remedies that Congress creates.
III. REFINING THE THEORY: SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF
JUDICIAL POWER
If the presidential immunity decision has any constitutional basis,
its theory is probably that the federal courts may not punish the Presi-
dent of the United States for misconduct. Although the majority based
its conclusion primarily on "public policy," the decision finds more
solid support in the history and structure of the system of checks and
balance. The time has come, then, to treat some rather obvious objec-
tions to this theory that the system of checks and balances prohibits
judicial creation of new remedies against the President, objections that
although unmentioned in the previous pages, must surely have been
burning in the reader's mind. If the federal courts can never create new
remedies then what have they been doing all these years with injunc-
tions and damages against other executive officials? Would the theory
really require the remarkable conclusion that the courts must stop? If
the federal courts really cannot punish the President, can they really be
said to have the power to "command" him to act? If Congress alone
may punish the President, then what has the system as a whole to say
to an individual wronged by presidential action? These objections are
strong, but the theory developed in the preceding sections, with only
minor modifications, can handle them.
120 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding provi-
sion limiting President's power to remove commissioner of independent agency).
433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding restrictions on President's ability to dispose of
his personal papers). This case is discussed in greater detail supra text accompanying
notes 37-39.
122 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The
case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 194-202.
12s See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
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A. Relaxing the Rule: A Proposal for a Judicial "Necessary and
Proper" Clause
The Supreme Court has never adhered to the theory that the Con-
stitution prohibits the judiciary from providing any remedy against the
executive or legislative branches not expressly authorized by the Consti-
tution. If it did so, much of the accepted machinery of judicial review
would suddenly be rendered inoperable. Thus, on the same day that it
decided the presidential immunity case, the Supreme Court ruled in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald2 4 that the rule against implying a cause of action
for civil damages in cases of presidential misconduct would not apply
ipsofacto to suits against the President's aides. Their liability or immu-
nity would be judged instead under the standards set forth in Butz v.
Economou,'25 in which the Court held for the first time that high-rank-
ing federal officials might, in certain cases, be ordered to pay damages
to individuals injured by the officials' abuse of power.1 26 The federal
courts, moreover, have frequently issued orders commanding lower fed-
eral officers to act in one way or refrain from acting in another. Yet the
Constitution nowhere grants the courts the explicit authority to issue
orders in these areas. Are these, then, forbidden new remedies?
Perhaps this puzzle lends support to the suggestion made earlier
that Nixon v. Fitzgerald was a federal common law decision and not a
constitutional one. Even if the case is viewed as having established a
constitutional rule, however, the presidential immunity decision need
not be read as inconsistent with "executive review" of the kind in
which federal courts routinely engage.
In the first place, lower officials are not the President. This dis-
tinction is crucial if part of the reason for the immunity rule is the
unique status of the President in the structure of government. All the
executive authority is vested in the President. 27 Other officials exercise
only as much of it as the President permits, and they are always subject
to his direction. 28 It is the President who stands for election after four
124 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
125 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
126 Economou was not, however, the first Supreme Court case to infer a private
cause of action against a federal official for constitutional violations. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The distinction is that Bivens involved rela-
tively low-level personnel not expected to exercise broad discretion, whereas Economou
permitted a suit against a cabinet official who, as such, was granted enormous
discretion.
127 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
128 The assertion that executive officials act only under the President's direction
should not be taken to imply that, as a practical matter, the President can possibly
know everything that is going on-or even a substantial portion of what is going
on-in the executive branch. He can, however, find out (if he wants to) what any
19831 1373
HeinOnline -- 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1373 1982-1983
1374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1341
years, 29 and it is the President against whom most of the political
fire-from Congress, from the press, and from the public-will ulti-
mately be directed.130 That says a great deal, but it does not say every-
thing. Lower federal officials, after all, can be hired and fired, and even
impeached and removed from office by Congress. So the Constitution
includes some very specific checks on the lower officials and their
power. How, then, can the federal courts create new ones?
One answer may be that the Framers thought that the general
grant of "the judicial Power of the United States" to courts created by
Congress under Article III included a grant of power to formulate
proper remedies for misconduct.1 "' A better answer may be that "judi-
cial Power" must mean something, and the term might reasonably be
read to imply a general remedial power."3 ' Another and still better an-
particular agency or official is doing and may, within the bounds of the law, direct that
agency or official to do otherwise.
12 The Framers apparently considered four years a rather short term of office,
and not nearly enough time for the President to do very many evil things. See 2
RECORDS, supra note 75, at 524 (A. Hamilton) (President elected for four years pref-
erable to "a monster elected for seven years"). The general idea was to keep the term
short enough so that the public could depose a President who did wrong. Today, some
propose that the President be limited to a single, six-year term. In fact, because deci-
sions can now be implemented so swiftly, the Framers' concerns would be better served
by shortening the President's term.
1 0 Thus, bad policymaking in the executive branch is frequently blamed on the
President and not his aides. That attitude makes systemic sense: the President is vested
with the entirety of the executive power, and it is perfectly legitimate to hold him
responsible for his delegations of authority.
11 There is little disagreement that the Framers expected the federal courts to
possess some inherent power to create appropriate remedies, even against the govern-
ment itself. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); P. SCHUCK, Supra note
29; G. WooD, supra note 71. The concept of judicial review may be viewed as a mere
variation on traditional equity power. Even the opponents of a broad inherent remedial
power concede that some equitable authority was intended. See, e.g., G. McDOWELL,
E uITY AND THE CONSTrrunON (1982). Interesting treatments of the historical views
on the inherent equitable powers of the federal courts appear in two articles by Robert
von Mischzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 287
(1927), and Mischzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence, 74 U.
PA. L. REv. 109 (1925).
182 Article III defines the "judicial Power of the United States" as "extend[ing] to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the
United States." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). This phrase cannot easily
be construed to mean that the selection of remedies is left entirely to some other body,
such as Congress. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as Sword,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1540-43 (1972). The federal courts have broadened their
willingness to exercise inherent equitable powers to the point where innovative reme-
dies have become the order of the day. See, e.g., 0. Fi.s, THE CIvIL RIGHTS INjuNC-
TION (1978); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 1109 (1969). This
development is not, of course, without its critics. See, e.g., G. McDOWELL, supra note
131 (expansion of remedies mistakes meaning of equitable power); Nagel, Separation
ofPowers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978)
(doctrine of separation of powers limits equitable power); Van Alstyne, supra note 33
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swer is that the Constitution leaves the organization of the federal
courts to Congress, and Congress, relying on its express powers and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, has granted to the federal courts the au-
thority to issue appropriate remedies in particular cases. 33
Although each of the answers has some merit, they do not-either
singly or together-suffice. Each supports the conclusion that the fed-
eral courts are empowered to create new remedies for misconduct in
appropriate cases. That authority, however, cannot be infinite, and
none of the answers set out above can explain rationally where the
limits lie. The "public policy" analyses made by the Court in the two
Fitzgerald cases may supply a basis for delineating those limits.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, Justice Powell wrote for the majority that
in weighing the former President's claim to immunity, the Court must
determine whether "judicial action is needed to serve broad public in-
terests. '" 1 That statement might be written off as a mere assertion of
what is "good" or "bad," not related to the structure, text, or history of
the Constitution.13 5 If, however, the majority intended to state a consti-
tutional rule, then this comment about necessity should be examined in
more detail. The opinion gave as an example of the kind of "necessity"
that might justify judicial action, intervention "not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance." 6 The
majority cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 37 as an in-
stance in which this type of intervention had been necessary. In
Youngstown, the powers of government were thought to have been
thrown out of balance by the executive branch's attempt to undertake
what the Court insisted was a legislative responsibility. 33 Presumably,
(judicial selection of remedies is narrowly circumscribed absent congressional
authorization).
133 Cf Dellinger, supra note 132, at 1543-52 (discussing ways of harmonizing
judicial and congressional authority to create remedies for constitutional violations);
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 216, 225, 241 (1948) (recommending legislation channeling judicial dis-
cretion to imply private rights of action).
I3- 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (emphasis added).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
136 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.
131 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the Steel Seizure Case).
13 In Youngstown, the Court acted at the behest not of Congress, but of the own-
ers of the steel mills that the President had seized without legislative authorization. So
although the Justices arguably were called upon to act in order to preserve the separa-
tion of powers, the fact remains that Congress was not complaining about any presi-
dential arrogation of legislative responsibilities.
Professor Choper, in his Separation Proposal, see supra notes 59 & 108, suggests
that the Court should have held the issues presented by Youngstown nonjusticiable,
because the mill owners were not claiming a right to be free of any government seizure
of the mills, but only of a seizure without congressional authorization. J. CHOPER,
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the Nixon v. Fitzgerald majority believed that only judicial action could
rectify the imbalance-a view that may or may not have been correct.
The citation to Youngstown may give some indication of the kind of
imbalance the Nixon v. Fitzgerald majority had in mind. In Nixon v.
Fitzgerald the Court could find no necessity sufficient to justify judicial
intervention; the existing balance of powers was adequate.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, however, Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion said something very different. "In situations of abuse of office," he
wrote, "an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for
vindication of constitutional guarantees."189 Thus the Court concluded
that the misbehavior of presidential aides-unlike the misbehavior of
the President himself- may necessitate judicial intervention. Because
intervention may sometimes be necessary, formulating a rule granting
aides absolute immunity would be inappropriate. Instead, the aides are
immune only "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.
14 0
The question whether the Court's conclusion in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald is right or wrong can be put aside for the moment. More impor-
tant at this point is the standard that the majority applied. The crite-
rion that distinguished Harlow v. Fitzgerald from Nixon v. Fitzgerald
in the minds of the Justices was the necessity for judicial action. In the
supra note 59, at 271-72. The underlying premise of Choper's argument is that in a
case such as Youngstown, individual litigants are essentially asserting what might be
called "Congress's rights" rather than their own. The difficulty with this premise is
that it assumes that the only reason that the governmental structure has been created
the way it has is in order to protect the institutions of government from one another.
The desire to protect the branches from each other is one reason-but the less impor-
tant one-that the government is structured as it is. Far more important is the need to
create a particular legal and political process for the protection of citizens. The system
of checks and balances is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. When a citizen is
deprived of something and the system of checks and balances-that means to an
end-has been ignored, that individual has a colorable claim that he was denied due
process.
The thesis presented in this Article-that the working of the system of checks and
balances is mostly political-is certainly one that underlies Professor Choper's Separa-
tion Proposal, but the thesis presented here would not require that the courts play so
narrow a role as Choper would prescribe.
139 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814. Actions for damages against the
Crown's ministers were recognized at common law. For an explanation of the evolution
and operation of this process, see P. ScHucK, supra note 29, at 30-35. See also supra
note 114 (Watergate tapes case as analogous) and infra note 215 (views of Framers).
140 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818. This so-called "objective" standard is
supposed to protect government officials from unnecessary interference with their duties
by permitting frivolous suits to be dismissed on the pleadings, but it is questionable
whether the standard really has the intended effect. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at
68-79, 87-99.
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one case, the Court reasoned, implied civil damages liability was neces-
sary; in the other, it was not. Similarly, the subpoena approved by the
Court in United States v. Nixon may have been necessary in a way that
an ordinary injunction against the President is not.14' In ordering the
President to turn over the Watergate tapes, the Justices must have be-
lieved that inaction on their part would do violence to the system of
checks and balances and that action was therefore essential. A similar
premise must underlie the Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
That premise may be true or false, 142 but it is certainly consistent with
the reasoning used by the majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. For while
the Court recognizes that there might sometimes be a need to hold
lower executive officials to liability in damages, the Court takes the
view that the need for imposing that punishment-that check-on the
President has not been demonstrated. 43 That is why the Court could
reach different results in the two Fitzgerald cases and yet justify each
as a matter of constitutional power rather than of judicial prudence.
On this view, the constitutional grant of "the judicial Power" be-
comes a kind of judicial "necessary and proper" clause with respect to
the creation of remedies for wrongs arising under the Constitution and
the laws of the United States. 44 If this theory is correct, the fedt -1
courts may indeed establish fresh remedies-remedies not called for L,,
the Constitution-but not in every case. They may do so only when the
new remedies are necessary and proper.
141 Certainly that is the thrust of Professor Freund's comment quoted supra note
114.
142 The Chief Justice, alone in dissent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, argued vigorously
that the premise is false. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 822-24. The question
whether the case's result is correct is discussed in brief infra, text accompanying notes
217-19.
14 For reasons that will shortly become clear, what matters is not whether judi-
cial intervention is "necessary" in order to protect individual rights, but whether it is
"necessary" to ensure adequate checks on misconduct. Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow
v. Fitzgerald are harmonized if one accepts the proposition that adequate checks exist
on the President but not on his assistants. See also infra text accompanying notes 216-
17.
144 This idea is intimated in J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), in
which the Court suggests that implication of a private right of action might turn on the
cnecessity" or "appropriateness" of that remedy. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-11 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Profes-
sor Dellinger and Professor Van Alstyne have both suggested that the equitable powers
of the federal courts might authorize them to create those remedies that are "essential"
or "indispensable." See Dellinger, supra note 132, at 1547-52; Van Alstyne, supra note
33, at 796-98. Dellinger also considers the Borak language quoted earlier in this foot-
note, but he concludes that the proper inquiry is whether the remedy is necessary to
guarantee individual rights, not whether it is necessary to ensure the continuing balance
of powers. Dellinger, supra note 132, at 1550-51.
1983]
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Like the Article I necessary and proper clause, 14 5 the Article III
grant of judicial power would have its limits. The Article I clause per-
mits Congress to enact laws that are necessary and proper to further
some particular national power. Since the time of McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 48 it has been clear that the Clause presents no formidable barri-
ers to legislative activity. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in Mc-
Culloch, the Article I necessary and proper clause is a grant of power,
not a limitation on its use.1 47 The terms of the clause have always been
read broadly. The concept of "necessary" has never been taken to re-
quire "absolute necessity"; some sort of reasonable relationship between
ends and means has been sufficient. 48 The word "proper" has been
read to mean "appropriate," which adds little to "necessary," except
for a strong implication that legislation is appropriate only when it does
not conflict with another constitutional provision.
1 4
1
So it could be with Article III's grant of judicial power. In formu-
lating fresh remedies for misconduct by the other branches of govern-
ment, the judiciary would have to act with like constraints in mind.
The remedies created under Article III must bear a reasonable relation
to the wrong-in other words, they must be a good idea-and they
must also be consistent with the other provisions of the Constitution.
Deciding whether a remedy is a good idea is a task that has, since
equity took form many centuries ago, been left to the wisdom of the
court. The problem of assuring the constitutionality of a fresh remedy
is also for the court in the first instance, but it is important to search
for limiting standards.
One possible limiting standard derives from the separation of pow-
ers, which might require the courts to impose the least intrusive among
arguably necessary remedies. For example, it can be argued that
neither an award of damages nor a prohibitory injunction is as intru-
sive into the affairs of another branch as is a structural injunction. 50 If
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the ... [enu-
merated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
148 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
147 Id. at 413-21.
148 The classic formulation of this doctrine is Marshall's statement in McCulloch:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
149 See L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 228.
150 See P. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 14. As Professor Schuck demonstrates, how-
ever, an award of damages can be more intrusive than anything else. Forcing an official
to pay money from his own pocket may chill the official's willingness to exercise discre-
tion. See id. at 68-81. In traditional separation of powers analysis, the degree of intru-
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that is the case, the court should be quicker to award one of the former
remedies against an executive functionary. 1 " On the other hand, to the
extent that an award of damages is viewed as punishment for wrongdo-
ing,1 52 the court should be reluctant to impose the award at all (espe-
cially upon the President), because the system of checks and balances
plainly leaves punishment of the President to political actors other than
the courts.
Another way of ensuring the constitutionality of a fresh remedy
would be to make the standard for "necessity" somewhat higher under
Article III than it is under Article I. If the federal courts essentially
serve as referees in the game of checks and balances, then they ought to
follow the suggestion in the majority opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
and hold that the only necessity that matters is the necessity to preserve
the system.' 53 "Necessity" would then be an indispensable'" but not
sufficient condition for the creation of a fresh remedy.' 55
Raising the necessity barrier also makes systemic sense. As a gen-
eral rule, the powers granted to Congress are plenary. Although it may
siveness is critical. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
I In practice, injunctions are awarded against federal officials more often than
are damages. The injunctions awarded, however, are usually mandatory or prohibitory
injunctions; structural injunctions against coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment are, as they should be, exceedingly rare.
152 The idea that an award of damages is punishment makes a good deal of sense
if one considers the vantage point of the defendant, who is unlikely to see an award of
damages as anything else. In addition, an award of damages, unlike an injunction,
looks mostly to past rather than to future conduct, and thus again resembles punish-
ment. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Micui. L. REv. 5, 53 (1980). The mere
fact that an award of damages looks to future conduct in the sense of (possibly) deter-
ring it, does not change the status of damages as punishment for the individual
defendant.
153 A form of this argument has been used to defend a broad inherent judicial
review function that Congress cannot limit through use of the "exceptions" clause. The
federal courts, some say, must have whatever jurisdiction is "necessary" to vindicate the
balance of powers. See, e.g., Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Con-
stitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981) (Supreme Court may use inherent power to
restore balance of powers by striking down "court-stripping" legislation); see also Ei-
senberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (federal courts must have adequate jurisdiction to play constitu-
tional role).
'" This is not to suggest that all "court-as-referee" cases ought to be viewed as
instances of constitutional crisis, but rather that when asked to intervene in a dispute
between two branches, the Court should have the preservation of the system as its
prime concern.
55 At the risk of trivializing the argument, it is worth pointing out that among
other requirements, until the appropriate case arises, the courts cannot create a fresh
remedy, no matter how great the necessity. This distinction between the judicial power
to act out of necessity and the legislative power to do the same is crucial to a proper
understanding of the system of checks and balances.
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not, of course, legislate in violation of the Constitution, the legislative
branch is in the strongest position to be innovative and creative. The
federal courts, on the other hand, are merely reactive-they resolve
only controversies brought before them but cannot make law on their
own initiative-so they have less opportunity to exercise creativity. As
long as the courts follow Nixon v. Fitzgerald and impose only the least
intrusive remedy needed to preserve the balance of powers, they will be
acting in conformance with the mandates of the Constitution.156
Assuming that Congress either does not possess or, in the end,
chooses not to exercise a power to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion over specific categories of constitutional cases, the only checks on
the judicial creation of new remedies will be those imposed through the
political process. Checks of this kind, while carrying considerable force,
are imposed in a manner that is essentially standardless. Some of the
checks are the traditional ones. The size of the Court may be altered,
new justices may be appointed, the Court's budget may be slashed,
157
and so on. Even adverse public opinion, when it grows to the point of
threatening the widespread acceptance of the Court's legitimacy, plays
a role. 5 The major check, however, is the most practical one, self-
imposed to avoid an external threat: the realization that other branches
of the federal government may refuse to comply with the courts'
dictates.
Suppose for example, that the Supreme Court, in a burst of fool-
ishness were to declare that because the President deserved impeach-
ment, and Congress had failed to act, the Constitution required that the
President be suspended from office until Congress did its duty, or re-
156 The courts have available other "remedies" for misconduct that are considera-
bly less extraordinary. For example, the Supreme Court has laid down a rule that
statutes should be construed so as to avoid any constitutional problems. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958). This rule is obviously a means by which the Court can "outlaw" behavior
it finds objectionable without reaching the issue whether the behavior actually violates
the Constitution.
157 If the Justices are determined to rule in a particular way, budget-cutting
should have little effect. Their salaries cannot be diminished, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1,
and although their staff support may shrink, and they may even lose their building and
their print shop, they can continue to issue their opinions, even if they must scribble
them on cardboard found in the street. I am indebted to Guido Calabresi for pointing
out to me the ability of the Justices to resist this particular form of pressure.
158 It is far too late in the day to claim the courts are completely insulated from
public opinion, as Hamilton said they would be, see THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490
(A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961), but studies of the judicial response to public opin-
ion do suggest that "[flalling support does not produce the automatic alterations in
policy output in the federal judicial system to the extent that occurs with other social
and political systems," S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A
POLITICAL SYSTEM 148 (1971).
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quired that the Court command Congress to impeach and convict. The
Court might justify these orders as necessary to restore the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branches. Sheer nonsense?
Something that would never happen? Perhaps. And it may be true, as
John Ely has remarked, that "it can only deform our constitutional
jurisprudence to tailor it to laws that couldn't be enacted,"'1 9 or pre-
sumably, to decisions that could never be handed down. Still, the Jus-
tices have done some peculiar things over the past two centuries,160 and
there is time for them to do a few more before the millenium. So, it
might be wise, at least for the sake of discussion, to take seriously the
possibility that the Court would act irresponsibly.
If the Court did order the President suspended, creating an action
suspendatur per necessitas as it were. 6 the President would certainly
refuse to leave, and it is unlikely (although anything is possible) that
the House would then impeach him for failure to comply with the de-
finitive order of the Supreme Court. Similarly, if the Court ordered the
House to begin impeachment proceedings against the President, the
Justices might be surprised to learn the identities of those finally
named in the bill of impeachment. In short, by attempting to create
these remedies, the Court would risk the precious aura of legitimacy
that feeds its authority. That the Justices are unlikely to do.
That conclusion includes both descriptive and prescriptive ele-
ments. It describes the way judges actually behave. Judges do hesitate
to issue orders when there is doubt as to whether the orders will be
obeyed.162 The Supreme Court has more than once expressed concern
over the possibility that a decree running against a co-equal branch of
the United States government might be ignored.'63 The judicial ten-
' ' J. ELY, supra note 64, at 183.
160 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racially-defined
exclusion of American citizens approved); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (woman's place is in the home); Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (black persons held inferior to others).
161 This irresistible but atrocious pun does literally mean what it appears to
mean, "suspended by necessity," but the word "suspendatur" refers to the kind of sus-
pension that occurs when one is hanged by the neck. Still, presidential suspension
would, like hanging, be a form of punishment.
.62 For a discussion of this problem, see, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Tern-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HAuv. L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1979).
163 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-01 (1867);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793). In the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court has managed to temper this fear because it has mustered powerful
public support for its institutional legitimacy. See infra note 170. Nevertheless, Presi-
dent Nixon's potential defiance may have been one of the elements underlying the
Court's strongly-worded opinion in United States v. Nixon, see supra note 112, and
future defiance, especially in this era of political assault on the Court's legitimacy, is
hardly out of the question.
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dency to try to conserve what it and others see as precious "constitu-
tional capital" is frequently lauded,'" but this same tendency is some-
times criticized as well for being taken too far." 5
The prescriptive element is somewhat more complex. Certainly a
judge should not refuse to award the remedy that justice demands
merely because official defiance is possible. The practice that Professor
Fiss has labeled "tailoring the right to fit the remedy"' 6 smacks more
of judicial fearfulness and submissiveness than of judicial courage or
prudence. There is something to be said for doing the right thing, and
if more of a motivation is needed, the judge may always hope for vindi-
cation by history.'6 7 But the judge must strike a delicate balance. The
fact that another branch of government is well positioned to ignore the
order ought to give her pause. Perhaps there are strong structural rea-
sons counseling against intervention by the judiciary. Perhaps the con-
stitutional system commits decision elsewhere. Perhaps the question in-
volves one of what Justice Frankfurter called "those decencies of
conduct which should control the other branches of government but are
without judicial sanction.""6 8 The courts, in short, cannot do every-
thing. When the political structure makes disobedience both likely and
constitutionally defensible,'69 the courts are probably straying very
close to one of those things that they should not do. Ordering the Presi-
dent to quit or the Congress to impeach would surely be among those
things: the structure of the system makes defiance both easy and likely.
So the objection is well-taken. The hypothetical would never occur
as a practical matter. Thus, a judicial "necessary and proper" clause
164 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 69, at 111-98; J. CHOPER, supra note 59, at
140-50. Scholars sometimes assert that public resistance to judicial decrees can even
serve a kind of "educational function" for the Justices. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MO-
RALITY OF CONSENT 94-126 (1975) (interaction between court and other institutions)
[hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL, MORALITY]; Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Re-
view, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 516 (1982) ("it is a wise court that pays attention to the
community-not out of fear, but out of obligation"; "When the Court recognizes that it
has made a mistake, it should, in the appropriate case, rectify the situation").
16. See, e.g., Karst & Horowitz, supra note 55, at 53 (criticizing Court's tendency
to "sh[y] away from political confrontations it might lose"); Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 515-16 (1945) (attacking "blind def-
erence" to expertise).
"0 Fiss, supra note 162, at 55.
167 See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 715 (1976) (extolling as "luminous"
the first Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
16 Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV.
217, 235 n.2 (1955).
16' "Constitutionally defensible" should be taken only to mean that a branch of
government choosing to defy the order would have a colorable argument deriving from
constitutional structure. The dispute ultimately would be settled in the public arena, so
it does not really matter who is "right," in the sense of being able to set forth a more
impressive list of authorities.
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would limit the types of new remedies that could be created and would
not be a general license for the willy-nilly imposition of extraordinary
demands on other branches for the simple reason that if the demands
were ridiculous, the Congress and the President would ignore them.170
Civil damages for presidential misconduct are obviously in a dif-
ferent category. A sitting President ordered by the courts to pay money
damages would probably-although not certainly-pay up. Had one
vote shifted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a former President would have
faced a civil trial. Had the lower court found the former President lia-
ble, he would have paid its judgment or suffered the consequences, like
any other litigant.17 1 That result would not have been either ridiculous
or irresponsible. The Court could, however, sanely conclude that that
result was not necessary. Sufficient checks on presidential misconduct
already exist. The Nixon resignation (so the Justices might have rea-
soned) adequately illustrates the point. So the system of checks and bal-
ances is in good working order.172 Given that the system is functioning
170 The coin has another side, and this principle, too, will only limit the Court so
much. The ability of the other branches to govern is closely tied to a public perception
that their rule is in accordance with law. They therefore have an incentive not to diso-
bey too frequently the decisions of the federal courts. As one of my students has re-
cently put it, "[o]ver the years the Supreme Court has so clearly defined its role as
supreme interpreter of the Constitution and has so closely linked itself to the funda-
mental law of the nation that a loss of prestige for the Court is a loss for the Constitu-
tion as well." E. Shadur, The Nature of Judicial Review 6 (Oct. 1982) (unpublished
essay). Similarly, one branch will have difficulty withstanding a court order if the other
branch-or the voting public-wants the order enforced. Professor Wechsler has put
the matter simply:
[T]here are political limits on the Supreme Court's authority to bind the
other branches and the States by its interpretation of the Constitution but
. . . such limits are not reached without a national consensus shared by
both the President and Congress. Protest having less support cannot pre-
vail in the long run unless, perchance, it moves the Court itself to a rever-
sal of position.
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLum. L. R~v. 1001, 1009 (1965).
None of this should be taken as an endorsement of what Judge Wyzanski once called
the view of a "self-depreciatory skeptical seer" (Learned Hand), that "all depends
upon the mood and habits of a people; courts amount to little; and the doctrines of
constitutionalism constitute not law but the sort of myth which has as its chief worth
the encouragement of a continuity of customary habits and a spirit of moderation."
Wyzanski, Constitutionalisn: Limitation and Affirmation, in Gov- RME'r UNDER
LAW 473, 485 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956). As should be apparent from the text, this
author's view is that the system may be the problem or it may be the solution, but it
undeniably exists.
171 Unlike a sitting President, a former President is guarded by only a rather
small Secret Service contingent and commands no armed forces. Consequently, a team
of federal marshals could probably bring him to justice after a short battle.
172 See supra note 152. Not all checks exercised by one branch against another
should be considered punishments-consider, for example, the presidential veto or the
judicial power to hold statutes unconstitutional-but all punishments administered by
one branch to another should be considered checks. What the Nixon resignation makes
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well, the Court might conclude that the creation of the fresh remedy of
civil damages for a President's abuse of power is neither necessary nor
proper and is consequently not encompassed within the judicial power
of the United States.1"' There are, however, important reasons for
reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to his aides. Before con-
sidering those reasons, it is appropriate to pause and consider the im-
plications of the argument just presented.
B. The Sometimes-Forgotten Congressional Role
In its modified version, the rule banning the creation of new reme-
dies explains the presidential immunity decision and a large body of
additional precedent as well, but fails to answer the nagging question of
why the courts should bother to issue orders to the President when they
have no way of enforcing the orders against him.
The real answer may be that in the system of checks and balances,
the courts are equal to the other branches. Thus in the end, it is the
degree of political power that can be mustered that matters.174 If public
plain is that no systemic weakness requires his further punishment; the existing politi-
cal checks proved adequate to halt his wrongdoing. The individual's claim to relief
when harmed by official misconduct presents a different question. For the treatment of
that issue under this theory, see infra text accompanying notes 208-19.
178 Under the theory propounded in the text, the conclusion that a civil damage
remedy is neither necessary nor proper might change should there come a time when
the full weight of the federal legislative power is insufficient to restrain further presi-
dential misconduct. At that point, the federal courts might see the need to step in with
fresh remedies. The issue may be of purely theoretical interest, because if Congress
really could not control the President, judicial intervention might have little practical
effect. Cf infra note 175 (similar point on restraining congressional misconduct).
The general thrust of the first sentence of this footnote-that the meaning of the
Constitution's structural provisions as well as of its substantive clauses may change
with time-is somewhat different from the approach taken in the historical discussion a
few pages back, although it is in keeping with the ideas espoused by the scholars
quoted supra note 68. Arguments have indeed been made that the "correct" interpreta-
tion of various structural constitutional guarantees has changed over time. See, e.g.,
First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 349-59 (1968)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (tax immunity of nationally chartered banks); Munzer &
Nickel, supra note 69, at 1048-50 (treaty-making power).
174 After reading these words in an earlier version of this Article, Professor Robert
Cover penned the following observation:
It is an ancient idea that the judge/magistrate has as one of his primary
functions the job of controlling the "haughty, upraised arm of the mighty."
That law directed at controlling the mighty may fail goes without saying.
It also goes without saying that control over the weak and humble does
not require law.
Thus, the pronouncements made on the limits on judicial power in this section of the
essay should not be read as endorsements of the inequities inherent in the system. In
addition, nothing said here about the judicial role regarding the system of checks and
balances should be thought to apply ipso facto to the judicial role in the protection of
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opinion favors the Supreme Court as the most legitimate decisionmak-
ing body, then another branch of government will ignore a judicial or-
der at its peril. But had the New Deal Supreme Court, for example,
tried to issue an order running directly against President Roosevelt, his
likely defiance might severely have tested that legitimacy.1"5 The risk
involved in issuing orders against the President does not mean that
these orders should not issue. It means only that in seeking enforcement
of the orders, the courts must take their chances in the political arena,
just like everybody else.1"
individual rights against government excess.
175 By the same reasoning, judicial review of presidential impeachment proceed-
ings, which several scholars have suggested is permissible, see, e.g., R. BERGER, supra
note 94, at 103-21; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 55, at 51 n.25, might have little
practical effect. Given Congress's historical reluctance to use the machinery of impeach-
ment, the degree of public disapproval necessary before Congress would impeach and
convict a President of the United States can scarcely be imagined. See supra text ac-
companying notes 1-3. It is therefore remarkable that anyone would assume that the
kind of steamroller that could flatten a Chief Executive would pause because a federal
court asserted the power to intervene. Cf. J. CHOPER, supra note 59, at 125 (quoting
Jerome Frank) ("when public opinion reaches the proportions of a tidal wave, no
merely intellectual appeal can stop it"). A President with the political strength to shield
himself with a court order probably would have been strong enough to resist impeach-
ment in the first place. One might even argue that only a politically strong President
could convince a federal court that his challenge to congressional impeachment proceed-
ings presents a justiciable question. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65 (judges
may hesitate to issue orders not expected to have any effect). Similarly, a politically
powerful Chief Executive might have been able to convince the Supreme Court that the
issues involved in United States v. Nixon were not justiciable.
1M8 Although laws, very nearly all laws, are readily accorded general ac-
quiescence, and are easily effective, there are times when law does not
gain general consent merely by virtue of having been authoritatively pro-
nounced, and lacking such consent it cannot be effective ...
When people in the millions or even hundreds of thousands are op-
posed-intensely, consistently, and on principle-to a law bearing directly
on their conduct of ordinary affairs; effective enforcement is possible, if at
all, only through military occupation ...
The crucial point is that we engage in a contest of wills. . . .[Q]uite
literally . . . no one is under any legal obligation to carry out a rule of
constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court until someone else
has conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree directing him to
do so. Any rule of constitutional law not put into effect voluntarily by
officials and other persons who acquiesce in it, or not taken up by legisla-
tion and made more effective by administrative or noncoercive means-any
such rule is not in our system an effective rule of law. If there is wide-
spread nonobservance, the resources neither of private litigating initiative
nor of the judicial process as such are equal to making it effective. The
Court thus interacts with other institutions, with whom it is engaged in an
endlessly renewed educational conversation. It is a conversation that takes
place when statutes are construed, when jurisdiction is defined and per-
haps declined, when the lower federal courts are addressed by the Su-
preme Court as their "administrative head," and also when large "consti-
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One reason that this may rankle is that if the Court really must
enter the political arena to enforce its orders-and the Court's lack of
either purse or sword should make plain that it must"'7 -then the
available punishments for presidential abuse of power seem suddenly
inadequate. This appearance of inadequacy stems rather from the un-
fortunate fact that the federal government has come to operate some-
what differently from the government that the Framers envisaged. This
evolution does not mean that the scheme of checks and balances needs a
drastic overhaul-that presidential liability in civil damages or some
form of legislative veto is now necessary and proper-but rather that
Congress should begin again to play the role that the Constitution sets
for it in controlling presidential action.
The system of separated and balanced powers, more than it does
anything else, makes a statement about process. The Framers foresaw a
dynamic and continuing struggle for superiority,"'8 particularly be-
tween the two political branches of the federal government.'1 9 This
struggle would not necessarily revolve around a series of issue-by-issue
confrontations; rather, each branch would act in many areas at the
same time, using the full panoply of its powers to push forward in
some fields while backing off in others.1 80 In recent years (or perhaps
tutional issues" are decided. And it is a conversation, not a monologue.
A. BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 164, at 107-11. Thus, in the "political arena,"
things do not happen because they are "supposed to," but because someone does them.
The orders of a court are not obeyed merely because they are "supposed to" be, but
because someone decides to enforce them or to obey them.
177 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
178 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison); G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 446-
53, 606-15; cf. B. BAILYN, supra note 71, at 70-77 (1967) (colonial conception of Brit-
ish balance of powers). As former Attorney General Levi has explained:
The separation of powers doctrine . . .is a political doctrine. It is
based . . . on the idea that government institutions given separate func-
tions, organizations and powers will operate with different modes of rea-
soning. Each mode is important to the process of law formation and to the
generation of popular consent to the law.
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 390 (1976) (cit-
ing Buchanan, So Reason Can Rule; The Constitution Revisited, in GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD LIBRARY 435 (1975)).
This idea of the political nature of the system of checks and balances lies behind
Professor Choper's Separation Proposal. See J. CHOPER, supra note 59, at 265-70.
170 The Framers thought the struggle would occur mainly between Congress and
the President not because they believed that the Supreme Court would not strive to
compete with the other branches, but rather because they hoped that the Court, being
purely reactive, was less dangerous than the other branches. See THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (A. Hamilton); see also A. BICKEL, supra note 69, at 199-243.
180 See generally G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 547-62, 574-80; Levi, supra note
178, at 373-80. A general sense that the Framers viewed the system of checks and
balances as dynamic rather than static emerges from a study of such writings as
Madison's THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, and 51, and from statements at the time of
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recent decades) the President has been doing most of the pushing for-
ward and Congress most of the backing off."' 1 The only important ex-
ception came during President's Nixon's second term, when a dramati-
cally weakened President sometimes backed off too far.1 2 Aside from
that episode, although it still plays an enormous role in structuring the
operations of government, Congress has been relatively docile. The leg-
islators rarely act to rein in executive misuse of power or to force their
policy choices on a reluctant President. If the presidency sometimes
seems out of control-if the executive branch seems to have arrogated
considerable power at the expense of Congress-the fault may lie pri-
marily with politicians in Congress who lack the will and the courage
to rein the executive branch in. While there are obviously other, more
complex reasons, 1 3 it can hardly be said that Congress lacks the power.
drafting and ratification suggesting that remedies such as impeachment were intended
to address patterns of abuse, see infra note 203.
I'l8 "The Youngstown decision assuredly did not stop the flow of power from Con-
gress to the President. Only Congress can do that and in recent decades it has seldom
bothered to try." Karst & Horowitz, supra note 55, at 66. Some commentators think
otherwise. See, e.g., S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF Dis-
HARMONY 203-10 (1981) (arguing that Congress increased its power at the expense of
the presidency during the 1960's and 1970's); Levi, supra note 178, at 382 (suggesting
that problem of presidential arrogation of power can be traced to the time of Jefferson).
182 Perhaps, in the wake of the Watergate scandals and the Vietnam War, Con-
gress began to reassert itself in many of the ways that the Framers intended, exercising
authority that had lain dormant for many decades. See Zeidenstein, The Reassertion of
Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President, 93 POL. ScI. Q. 393 (1978). The
broad personal popularity of President Reagan may have slowed this trend-if it is a
trend-and might even have set it back a little, but as the President's standing in opin-
ion polls has dropped, congressional backbone has stiffened. See infra note 185.
183 To take just one example, Professor Black has argued persuasively that per-
haps the President really has become too strong, now that the veto has changed from a
device for protecting the presidency against encroachment to a means for enforcing po-
litical decisions. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1976, at 87. Black responds to critics of Congress this way:
Every candidate for the job of editorial-writer should be required to take
an examination with one question: "If 65 per cent in each House of Con-
gress favor and pass a comprehensive bill on energy, and the President
very much does not like it, what happens?" Because then we might hear
(and above all, for the sake of mercy, read) less criticism of Congress for
its "failure to act," and so on, ad nauseam. If you have a 65 per cent
majority in each House strong for a consumer bill, say, and the President
is dead set against it, then that consumer bill will not become law.
Id. at 94-95. Nor will it do, Black contends, to argue that Congress has a responsibility
to pass what legislation it thinks best and then, in essence, to dare the President to veto
it.
[T]he practical task of the leadership of the House of Representatives and
the Senate . . . is not to draft and pass a bill that seems good to strong
working majorities in the House and Senate. It is to produce a bill, accept-
able to those majorities, so reluctantly swallowed by those majorities, that
may get by a veto.
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The Framers of the Constitution probably considered the Congress the
most powerful branch of the new government they were creating. As
the Supreme Court has noted, the history of the drafting and ratifica-
tion is "replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of
the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the
other two branches.
'1 8 4
In the main, Congress legislates, and its legislative powers are
enormous. Congress can slash appropriations for programs the Presi-
dent favors and ram down his throat appropriations for programs he
would prefer to dissolve.18 5 In large measure, Congress may channel
the discretion of the executive branch and its agencies, setting policy
preferences and creating or rebutting presumptions. In truth, there is
little that the President can do for any length of time if Congress as a
body seeks to stop hi;m. Congress occasionally does try, but as a general
rule, it now mostly reacts to executive initiatives rather than pursuing
any of its own."8"
Id. at 95. Nevertheless, Black concludes, much as this essay does, that the solution is
for Congress to fashion its other constitutional powers into effective weapons with
which to force the President to compromise. See id. at 99-101.
If the President really does hold too much power, moreover, there must be contrib-
uting factors other than a failure of congressional will. American society has changed
drastically over the past two centuries. The broadcast media focus attention on the
President as an individual and Americans come to know their President in a way that
they can never know leading members of Congress. Problems often seem to demand
rapid, even immediate solutions, and Congress, a deliberative body, cannot work that
way. The President is therefore left to fulfill the popular demand for decisive action. In
addition, the executive branch, because it is motivated by the personality and values of
a single individual, may be able to adapt to changing circumstances more easily than
Congress. Improved party discipline, enforced by a "leadership committee" of the sort
used during Reconstruction, might be one way that the legislative branch could better
cope with the need for rapid solutions. There is, however, no apparent prospect that the
leadership will garner so much power.
While these observations provide a background against which congressional inac-
tion may be evaluated, they do not, without more, justify the shift of authority from the
legislative to the executive branch. Altering the course is still a congressional
responsibility.
184 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (per curiam). See also Watson, Con-
gress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALiF. L. REv.
983, 1030-49 (1975).
185 Recent examples of those processes at work include President Reagan's partial
defeats on the issues of funding for covert operations in Nicaragua and for the Legal
Services Corporation. For the Framers, the congressional power over the purse was one
of the most important checks on executive authority. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at
345 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) ("the legislative department alone has access to
the pockets of the people" which creates "a dependence" on Congress in the other
branches).
186 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), holding unconstitutional most forms of the legislative
veto, may have the long-term effect of forcing Congress to react less and initiate more.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at Al, col. 5 (predicting this change); id., July 5,
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This congressional passivity might shock many of the Framers of
the Constitution, who assumed that Congress would make the laws. 87
The past two centuries, however, have brought about additional, per-
haps more startling changes in the relationship between the Congress
and the President. One such change is the virtual atrophy of the power
of the Senate to advise and consent on appointments. 88 Confirmation
of most presidential appointees has become a mere formality. With a
handful of exceptions, the modern congressional approach has been to
judge individual nominees on what are sometimes called "the merits,"
which generally refers to track record and political skeletons. The Sen-
ate usually ignores the possible use of its confirmation power to force
presidential concessions on other issues."" 9 Judging appointees purely
on their merits seems a wonderfully liberal idea, but in prac-
tice--especially when combined with the widely-accepted myth that the
President "deserves" to install "his own team" in the executive
branch-it eliminates a major means for checking the President. The
Framers apparently expected that Senate confirmation of his nomina-
tions would be a carrot with which the Senate could tempt the Presi-
dent to give ground in other areas. °90 If the President misbehaved on
1983, at A19, col. I (suggesting some changes). See generally Kaiser, Congressional
Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L.
REv. 667 (1980).
187 But see infra note 199.
18 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
189 The Senate has tended to scrutinize judicial appointments with a bit more
care, and for a reason that should be plain: judges, who remain in office long after the
Administration has left, are not part of the President's team. To illustrate this princi-
ple, one need only recall the results of President Hoover's nomination of Judge Parker
to the United States Supreme Court and of President Nixon's nominations of Judge
Carswell and Judge Haynsworth to that tribunal. The point is not that the Senate was
"right" or "wrong" in rejecting these nominations; the point rather is that a different
standard would probably have been applied had the three been nominated for posts in
the executive branch.
190 Writing in The Federalist, Hamilton contended that the Senate would consent
to nominations on the basis of the merits of the candidates involved. THE FEDERALIST
No. 76, at 482-84 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). He conceded, nevertheless, that
this contention was counterintuitive, that the exercise of the appointment power would
ordinarily be expected to serve as an occasion for negotiation and coalition-building, for
giving on some issues in order to take on others. Id. In the course of the debates over
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, any number of delegates echoed the
latter view. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 522-23 (J. Wilson) (Senate will
treat President as "Minion"); 3 id. at 357 (R. Sherman) (Senate's power "would tend
to secure the liberties of the people"); 4 DEBATES, supra note 83 at 116-18 (S. Spen-
cer) (President will take only action that is "convenient" for leaders of Senate; 2 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 508 (J. Smilie) (as long as Senate has power of
confirmation, President is "merely a tool to the Senate"). In practice, the Congress has
adopted a number of plans-some more constitutional than others-to limit the Presi-
dent's appointment power without seeming to reject qualified nominees. See E.
CORWIN, supra note 47, at 73-79. A polite form of horse-trading is the venerable "sen-
1983]
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issue A, then his candidate for position B would not, no matter how
highly qualified, be confirmed. If the President yielded on issue C, then
his less-than-qualified crony would be confirmed for position D. At
times, this kind of political horse-trading still goes on,"'1 but the gen-
eral expectation that Senators should and will focus on the merits forces
the deals behind the scenes, because horse-trading is considered some-
how disreputable rather than a part of the constitutional process. This
is unfortunate. One need only consider the vast range of positions for
which Senate confirmation is required to realize the potential for con-
gressional limitation of the executive inherent in the conformation
power. 
1 2
Just as the confirmation power has, in recent decades, lost much of
its force as a check, so have several types of congressional action that
could be used to punish executive abuses of authority or to force
changes in executive policy.19 The relatively rare use of the impeach-
ment machinery against presidents might show that the nation has had
a surfeit of good and kind and wise executives, but it might also provide
evidence that Congress feels constrained by its own power rather than
emboldened by it. So the massive potential of Congress's many powers
lies untapped, the dynamic nature of the system of checks and balances
is ignored, and Congress continues to seek ad hoc means for controlling
presidential action on particular issues.
In keeping with this flawed approach has been the consistent con-
gressional reliance on the "legislative veto." Through this device, Con-
gress has sought to delegate broad authority to the executive branch
atorial courtesy," through which a Senator may hold up nominations for federal of-
ficers within his own state. See id. at 73-74.
191 Even judicial appointments are not immune to horsetrading. For example, the
nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Court of Appeals was suppos-
edly held hostage by Senator Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
until President Kennedy agreed to nominate Harold Cox to a vacancy on the District
Court in Mississippi. See Caldwell, Harold Cox: Still Racist After All These Years,
Am. Law., July 1979, at 29.
192 Although there are practical limitations on the exercise of the power, the Con-
stitution permits Congress to require Senate confirmation of virtually any employee of
the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
193 In addition to the more obvious powers already discussed-abolition of partic-
ular departments, withholding of appropriations-Congress also possesses a rather sub-
stantial discretion to conduct investigations. This discretion has been held to be part of
the legislative power. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959). The result in Barenblatt is often excoriated, but the majority's lan-
guage does purport to construe the investigative power narrowly, limiting it to areas in
which Congress "may potentially legislate or appropriate." Id. at 111. A somewhat
dated, but still useful, discussion of various means that Congress can use to control the
President is J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964).
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while retaining a measure of control over the exercise of that authority.
In mid-1983, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha94 that most forms of the legislative
veto are unconstitutional. Six members of the Court agreed that be-
cause the veto did not involve the exercise of one of Congress's implied
or enumerated powers, its use violated the principles of separation of
powers. 195 The Court rejected arguments that the legislative veto was
essential to allow Congress to delegate authority without giving the ex-
ecutive branch completely free rein. Not everything that is arguably
"necessary" or "efficient," the Court reasoned, is constitutional.196
Thus, the Court's conclusion in Chadha underscores an important
point made earlier: that those who advocate the creation of new checks
may ultimately be subverting the system in the guise of saving it.'
9 7
Critics of the Chadha decision quickly contended that in a modem
activist state, Congress "needs" the weapon of legislative veto, or much
power that should be delegated will not be. Congress will not delegate
the power if doing so means losing control over the power's exercise.198
That argument, in spite of some surface appeal, illustrates the concep-
tual difficulty shared by the legislative veto and the notion that the
President should be liable in civil damages for his official misconduct.
Both ideas are motivated by the view that institutional remedies are
necessary to respond to specific instances of abuse of authority. Both
ideas treat the relationships among the branches as part of a static,
stimulus-response type system, rather than a dynamic one in which the
working balance of power is constantly shifting. Both ideas, moreover,
seek to create fresh weapons in the struggle to control the President. In
rejecting both proposals the Supreme Court has evinced a clear prefer-
ence for the use of the considerable powers that the Constitution, on its
194 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983).
195 Although Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion and Justices
White and Rehnquist both authored dissents, only Justice White expressly disagreed
with the majority on the merits.
1,9 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2788. The argument that efficiency can support consti-
tutionality was frequently made prior to the Court's decision by proponents of the leg-
islative veto. See, e.g., Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Consti-
tutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Stewart, Constitutionality of the
Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593 (1976).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
198 In Chadha, the majority apparently disagreed with this contention, because in
ruling on standing to sue, the Justices decided that Congress would have delegated the
power in question (§ 244 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254
(1976), whether or not the legislative veto was available. 103 S. Ct. at 2786. As Justice
Rehnquist noted in dissent, the Court's conclusion is somewhat bizarre because Con-
gress was delegating a power it had previously exercised itself and probably did so only
with the understanding that it would retain a check on the power's exercise.
19831
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face, grants to Congress. The checks expressly authorized should be
adequate to rein in an abusive President.199 If it is dissatisfied with the
standard for benzene exposure promulgated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Congress need not resort to a legislative
veto to force a change. Congress could, for example, refuse to vote an
appropriation that the President desires or postpone the confirmation of
one of the President's nominees. Members of Congress should not hesi-
tate to hold one program hostage in order to force changes in an-
other. 00 If public pressure makes this strategy impossible, that simply
means that in a particular political struggle, the President has won.
That a system does not in the face of opposing public opinion lead
invariably to victory, hardly means that the system is evil or even weak.
Naturally, if Congress is going to use the full measure of its au-
thority to force concessions in one area in return, perhaps, for retreat-
ing itself in another, the leadership will have to pay careful attention to
the system of checks and balances. The decline of party discipline may
mean that the leadership will have difficulty in exercising control, 0 1
but with the demise of the legislative veto, enlightened self-interest may
move the Members into more consistent coalitions. No other course is
likely to lead to restoration of the balance of power, for the Supreme
Court's opinions in Chadha and Nixon v. Fitzgerald stand as obvious
calls to put politics back into the governing process.20 2 The system of
checks and balances is, after all, a political one, and its structure sug-
gests that the Framers cared more about making sure that no one
"" The term "abusive President" is used advisedly. Congress might be concerned
with two types of abuses: those involving wrongdoing in office, for which punishment
might be appropriate, and those involving the making of policy, for which pressure
rather than punishment would be appropriate. In designing the system of checks and
balances, the Framers were more concerned with the former than with the latter. They
were worried about creating a tyrant who would abuse his powers. They did not antici-
pate that the President would (through the growth of the executive agencies) also out-
strip the Congress in the race to make policy. For the Framers, Congress alone was the
lawmaking body, and it was the President merely who would react to the legislature's
initiatives. The alignment anticipated by the Framers has shifted nearly 180 degrees.
The reasons for the shift are probably complex, see supra note 183, but the solutions
must involve something other than attempts by Congress to find new ways to react to
policies proposed by someone else. The legislative veto was constitutionally doomed in
part because it tried to do precisely that. Instead, in keeping with the way the system of
government was designed to work, Congress should be searching for ways to regain
preeminence (or at least equality) in the proposal as well as in the disposal of policy
initiatives.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 189-92.
201 But see supra note 183.
202 One of the most unfortunate aspects of the reform-minded 1960's and 1970's
was the way that the word "politics" became more or less synonymous with "bad gov-
ernment." But the Constitution is a political document, not just a legal one, and not all
decisions on wise policy need be made by "experts."
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branch held total sway than they did about assuring the "best" decision
on every issue that might arise. In developing the structure of govern-
ment, the Framers sought to give each branch the powers necessary to
respond to patterns of abuse. 3
Thus, probably no one thought in 1787 that a President would be
impeached or defeated for reelection merely because he fired a single
civil servant unjustly or ordered a single illegal break-in.2 4 A President
might be impeached or defeated for either of those misdeeds, but the
issue would be entirely political, in the literal sense of that word: the
system would respond if public opinion considered the abuse suffi-
ciently heinous. On the other hand, should a President order a series of
illegal break-ins, sabotage political opponents, conspire to obstruct jus-
tice, and order secret military operations abroad, the Framers would
undoubtedly have felt that a pattern had been established, that here
was a tyrannical Chief Executive who had to go, whether by impeach-
ment or by resignation.20 5
The same would be true of an injunction or subpoena. Yes, a court
203 Both the words of the document and its history make clear that the Framers
contemplated impeachment of a President who committed a felony, but aside from felo-
nies, the evidence does not suggest that the President was to be punished for discrete
wrongs. This limitation should be plain from the structure of the government the Con-
stitution creates. The machinery available for presidential punishment-impeachment,
legislation, failure of reelection-is so unwieldy that it cannot easily be brought to bear
on a President whose acts are, in the view of the political actors in the system, relatively
minor. Some of the remarks made during the debates also suggest a concern for pat-
terns of abuse rather than for wrongs done to particular individuals. During the Phila-
delphia Convention, Madison argued that without the remedy of impeachment, the
Chief Executive "might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or op-
pression." 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 65-66. Randolph's fears that the President
would grow too powerful in time of war absent the impeachment remedy, are difficult
to understand in any other way. Id. at 67. And Franklin's half-joking reference to
assassination, id. at 65, was not likely aimed at a President whose "misconduct" com-
prised a single wrong done to one individual.
The historical evidence is hardly conclusive on the point, but when joined with the
structure of the system of checks and balances, the evidence does suggest rather strongly
that the Framers were not worried about such issues as whether a single civil servant
would lose his position unjustly. Perhaps the political and electoral checks on presiden-
tial misconduct are most effective when dealing with patterns of abuse but likely to fail
when confronting individual claims of hardship that must, in the larger scheme, be
considered de minimis. See infra note 209. Fortunately, the theory developed in text has
the happy byproduct of permitting remedies for many individual claims. See infra text
accompanying notes 208-19.
204 The articles of impeachment adopted by the House Judiciary Committee
shortly before President Nixon resigned did not include either of these charges. As the
text makes clear, however, the mere fact that Congress chooses not to impeach the
President for a particular abuse of authority does not mean that he will go unpunished.
Lesser sanctions are often available.
205 In fact, a strong argument can be made that the Nixon Administration ulti-
mately became precisely the "scheme of peculation or oppression" that Madison in-
sisted would render the Chief Executive impeachable. See supra note 203.
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may issue one, but if the President chooses not to obey, then it is up to
the political process to decide whether he ought to be punished for his
act of defiance. The political process includes the Congress, which will
act if a majority of its members choose to do so, and the public, which
may act if a majority of its members choose to do so.206 If the political
process does not force the President to obey a court order, then the
President will get away with disobeying it. The conclusion that the en-
forcement of judicial orders must be left to the political process is not
likely to please people trained as lawyers, because lawyers seek rules
and standards, and if enforcement of judicial orders is left to the politi-
cal process, then there really are none. 0 7 Lawyers, however, sometimes
forget that the Constitution is not merely a legal document; it is also a
political one. It describes more than a legal system; it describes a system
of government. Not all the decisions made in a system of government
are legal decisions. Many of these decisions are political ones, made not
by the lawyers in the system but by politicians and voters. Among the
decisions the Constitution vests in the political system is the decision
whether to punish the President of the United States.
C. But What About the Little Guy?
If punishing the President is up to the political system and if the
Framers were interested only in the big picture, then isn't civil damages
liability an appropriate (which is to say, necessary and proper) means
for granting relief to the little guy who has been wronged?
The answer is "no," although as will be seen, the "no" is a quali-
fied one. The system of checks and balances, the preservation of which
should be of preeminent concern, is a political system, and the struggle
for supremacy among the three branches is similarly a political one.
Supplying relief for the little guy-applying the maxim ubi jus, ibi
renedium-is not the purpose of the system.2 0 8 That is not because the
system is evil, but because trying to provide the best means for relief in
20 The voters in turn may be influenced by the enormous power of the modem
broadcast media, whose role in the function of the American political system has been
only inadequately explored.
207 For all that it may bother lawyers, the realization that the system of checks
and balances is essentially standardless would neither surprise nor disappoint a political
scientist. Cf LevinsonJudicial Review and the Problem of the Comprehensible Consti-
tution (Book Review), 59 TEx. L. REv. 395, 401 n.31 (1981) (suggesting distinctions
between views taken by lawyers and those taken by political scientists on same
institutions).
208 To say that relief for the wronged little guy is not the purpose of the system is
not to say it does not exist within the system. Fitzgerald himself, the plaintiff in the
presidential immunity case, was reinstated with backpay, in addition to being permitted
to pursue damages against presidential assistants.
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every case could, if it involves the creation of new remedies, raise the
same intractable problem discussed in the last few sections: The system
of checks and balances exists to eliminate the possibility of domination
by a single branch of government. The system was not designed to vin-
dicate each individual's every assertion of right. Any attempt to modify
the system to provide additional checks and balances carries the risk of
undermining the entire system. If one branch can "discover" or "im-
pose" a fresh remedy (especially for misconduct that must, in the
grander scheme, be considered de minimis)209 then that branch has a
fresh weapon in its continuing struggle with the other two branches. In
the absence of strict necessity, the constitutional scheme will not tolerate
the creation of these new remedies. "Necessity," moreover, must refer
to keeping the power in balance, and not to righting every wrong.
Improper presidential acts that do not provoke Congress into using
one of its big sticks-impeachment, say, or a rebellion on appropria-
tions-may yet be punished. If the President has political enemies care-
fully cataloguing his misconduct-and most Presidents do-then all his
acts that are even arguably wrong will be added to that list. If the list
grows long, the President's misdeeds may come back to haunt him as
his opponents recite them from the pulpits of the press and the broad-
cast media. Perhaps more important, the petitioners can be heard by
Congress if that body shows the spine and spunk to hear them. The
President would not necessarily be impeached and convicted as a result,
but even now, individual members of the Senate and the more powerful
members of the House are frequently able to take individual grievances
to the Administration. 10 Of course, the administration may turn a deaf
11, Certainly the wrongs charged in Nixon v. Fitzgerald were great and heinous,
but that is not the question. The question is whether, if necessity is a criterion for the
validity of new remedies, the necessity required should be based on the needs of a small
group of individuals or on the needs of the system. The thesis expounded in this essay
is that the only necessity justifying the creation of a fresh remedy is a fundamental
breakdown in the system of checks and balances, a reason to believe that the system is
not functioning as the constitutional structure requires. A failure to punish the Presi-
dent for a particular, discrete wrong does not amount to a breakdown of this sort.
Although one might argue that a failure to rectify a wrong done to even one citizen is a
breakdown that the system cannot tolerate (a proposition that is not easy to sustain, cf.
infra note 215), the argument cannot fairly be made in the case of a suit seeking dam-
ages for injury resulting from presidential misconduct. The President cannot act alone,
and someone will always be available as a proper defendant. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 216-17.
210 This description of the process of seeking a remedy may bring back memories
of old-style "boss" and "machine" politics, and the days when a citizen with a griev-
ance against the government went to see the local ward leader. The image may be
distasteful, but one should bear in mind that the idea of politicians acting out of
squeaky clean idealism is of relatively recent vintage. An important part of political
power, moreover, is the willingness to act to assist real individual people rather than
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ear, but if it does so too often, then a Congress that is fulfilling its role
in the system of checks and balances should slow legislation, appoint-
ments, or treaties the President has promoted, until the administration
becomes more cooperative. In this manner executive power can be con-
trolled even if Congress takes no formal measures.
Very well: in rare cases some sort of institutional response may be
forthcoming. But it will not be forthcoming in all cases, and perhaps
not in most. A wronged individual may bring his complaint to Congress
and yet receive no satisfaction. His Representative might ignore him,
the Judiciary Committee might make no report, the House might vote
not to impeach, the Senate, not to convict. None of that would mean,
however, that the system was not working. It is a little like something
Ann Landers once wrote of prayer: When someone prays but does not
get what he wants, it does not mean that the prayer has gone unan-
swered. It means only that the answer is "No."
The political system would be called upon to answer the question
whether the wrong done to a single individual by the President while
handling the myriad responsibilities of his office outweighs everything
else he might have done in a competent, even a brilliant, manner. The
answer often will not be easy. If Congress refuses to act, then it has
struck the balance against the petitioner and in favor of the status
quo.2" If the President's abuses grow, however, his partisans in Con-
acting on behalf of some amorphous concept of "the masses."
This argument does not mean that the Constitution was in some sense "designed"
to function in a system relying on political favors and debts. In their public rhetoric,
many of the Framers professed the ideological conviction that political parties are
anathema to the republican ideal. Arguably, the Constitution was drafted in part to
limit the influence of parties. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 1-
73 (1969). On the other hand, whether or not accepted in theory, political parties cer-
tainly existed and flourished before 1787. See generally J. MAIN, POLrICAL PARTIES
BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (statistical analysis of voting patterns in state leg-
islatures). Many preconstitutional party leaders represented their states at the Philadel-
phia Convention. See id. at 409-53 (names of party leaders). These party leaders pre-
sumably did not go to Philadelphia to reduce their own influence.
As voters have become more sophisticated and party identification less important,
the power and importance of political parties have declined. See S. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 181, at 205-10. That decline does not mean, however, that the ability of a
single politician to seek relief for a constituent, or of a number of politicians to form
temporary coalition on behalf of many constituents, has changed.
211 Congress may fail to act for any number of reasons, including mere partisan-
ship. See Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1133-
34 (1974). Berger made this point as part of an argument that punishment of the
President should not be left to Congress, essentially because Congress cannot be trusted.
Whether Berger is right depends, of course, on what Congress is being "trusted" to do.
If the system is a political one-if it is standardless-then Berger's argument loses its
force. Congress is after all a political body and, under this Article's view of the system,
choosing whether to punish the President is a political act.
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gress might abandon him. Even a popular President may be toppled by
the mass defection of supporters. This danger will lurk in the shadowy
recesses of the President's mind, forcing him to glance over his shoulder
as he embarks on a course he knows to be wrongful. The further down
the road he goes, the larger the danger will loom. At some point, fear
should stop him. As Elbridge Gerry remarked during the drafting of
the Constitution, "A good magistrate will not fear [impeachments]. A
bad one ought to be kept in fear of them." '212 Of course the threat of
catastrophe may not stop the President. It apparently did not stop
Richard Nixon. But that is why the threat is capable of execution. If
the fear of impeachment is not sufficient, then its reality should bring
even the most abusive Presidency to a close.
The end of a Presidency may bring but little relief to the individ-
ual who believes himself wronged by the President, and seeks damages
from him. Yet under the rule established in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
President need not make the individual whole. Does this rule mean that
there are indeed some rights for whose violation the law affords no
remedy?213 This question must be rephrased before it can be answered.
Proponents of civil damages liability have consistently asserted that the
number of "serious" lawsuits the President would have to face is
small.21' This assertion necessarily implies, the litigiousness of our soci-
ety being what it is (ubi jus, ibi lawsuit), that the number of individu-
als with serious grievances would also be small. So the real question is
whether in a handful of cases, there will be violations of right for
which there will be no remedy.
212 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 66.
213 Blackstone's traditional formulation, echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) held that a "right" without a
"remedy" is not worthy of the same. As will shortly be seen, a proper understanding of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald does not require disputing these venerable precedents.
214 Professor Schuck's work in the field suggests that this assumption may be chal-
lenged on two grounds, accuracy and relevance. The challenge to the assumption's ac-
curacy accepts the contention that only a handful of lawsuits have been filed against
Presidents and former Presidents based on their conduct while in office, but notes that
had the Court reached the opposite result in Nixon v. Fitzgerald the decision might
have been read a broad invitation to those with grievances to come forward and sue.
After all, since the Court handed down its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the number of civil damages actions against federal officials has
increased dramatically. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 199-202. Whether these suits
are meritorious is irrelevant; the important point is that they exist.
The challenge to the assumption's relevance disputes the contention that because
an "objective" standard (what a reasonable person would have understood) is applied,
and because the Justice Department will provide defense for those sued in their official
capacity, frivolous actions will be dismissed on the pleadings at virtually no cost to the
defendant. Professor Schuck suggests that the cost to the defendant can prove quite
substantial, even if not in money. Id. at 114-62.
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A "yes" answer would not be difficult to defend, because the rules
of any forum may be sufficiently strict to stifle some claims for relief.
There is no reason to expect special treatment for victims of presiden-
tial wrongs. The right answer, however, is "no," for a reason that
should be plain. An individual wronged by presidential order is not
without a damages remedy; he will ultimately be made whole. He is
only without the defendant of his choice. The President does not act
alone. In this sense, he is analogous to the British monarch who, some
delegates pointed out during the ratification debates, cannot carry out
any act without the assistance of aides, who may be punished."' 5 If any
individual is harmed by presidential decree, he may sue all the func-
tionaries below the Chief Executive in the chain of command from or-
der to act.
The lesser functionaries may be held liable because the Supreme
Court has extended to them its common law implied cause of action.21 6
The best rationale for their liability, however, is not the need for
awarding damages to an injured party, but the need to provide ade-
quate checks on official malfeasance. The existence of civil damages
actions against presidential aides is a useful by-product of the decision
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, but the desirability of providing a remedy for
the wronged individual is not a sufficient justification for the holding.
Under the analysis presented in this essay, Harlow v. Fitzgerald was
correctly decided only if this additional check is necessary to maintain
the balance of powers.
The best argument for the necessity of this check is that although
the Constitution establishes a framework for punishment and control of
'15 This comparison to the British monarchy was used two ways. For James Ire-
dell, speaking in the North Carolina ratification convention, the distinction between the
Crown and the President was an argument in favor of ratification. The King was pre-
sumed to do no wrong, and his adviser would be punished in his stead. The President,
"[if] he commits any misdemeanor in office,. . . is impeachable, removable from office,
and incapacitated to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit. If he commits any crime,
he is punishable by the laws of his country, and in capital cases may be deprived of his
life." 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 109. ForGouverneur Morris, in the Philadelphia
Convention, this same distinction was (until he changed his mind) an argument against
the necessity for impeachment: "[The President] can do no criminal act without
Coadjutors who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be suffi-
cient proof of his innocence." 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 64.
216 The Court held that the so-called "objective standard" applies to these cases.
The application of this standard means that if the defendant can show that he acted as
a reasonable person would have under the circumstances, the plaintiff will probably
recover nothing. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. That result is a function of
the standard of liability and has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff can seek to be
made whole. A damages action for official misconduct is like any other damages action:
when the defendant has an adequate defense, the plaintiff, injured or not, will recover
nothing.
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an evil President, it does not do the same with respect to lower federal
officials.217 Thus, civil damages liability for the lower officials does not
constitute a fresh check in the same way that similar liability for the
President would constitute one. The constitutional system of separated
and balanced powers is designed to keep in check the President himself,
not his aides. That same system is adequate for preserving a congres-
sional role in the making of policy, which is why Chadha was rightly
decided. Legislative vetoes and civil damages liability of the President
would upset the delicately crafted system. With respect to the Presi-
dent's aides, however, there is no delicately crafted system to upset.
218
Thus, civil damages liability for lower executive-branch functionaries is
arguably necessary to preserve the balance of powers. Happily, the
remedy has the advantage of making whole those who have been dam-
aged by executive action.219
The issue, then, is not really whether a remedy exists, but only
whether the President is to be among those against whom the remedy
will run. Resolution of that issue has nothing to do with setting right a
wrong and everything to do with the balance of powers.220
2117 In particular (although this argument can be taken too far), the constitutional
structure provides evidence that the Framers did not anticipate the massive growth in
the power and responsibility of the executive branch. The Framers came to the Consti-
tution from the experience of the Articles of Confederation, which created no executive
branch. Although the desire to create a strong executive did much to motivate the call
for a new Constitution, see generally G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 393-429, it would be
counterhistorical to assume that the executive branch as it exists today is the one that
the Framers anticipated. This justification may not be the most effective one for the
result in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, but it is the type of argument that must be made if the
case is to be explained under the theory advanced in this essay. The alternative is the
one advocated by the Chief Justice in his dissent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald to wit, that
the case was wrongly decided. But it is far easier to show that presidential assistants
are unlike the functionaries sued in the cases he cites, see supra note 117, than to show
that they are like the President.
18 Those who consider the original understanding may find significance in the
apparent belief of some of the Framers that a civil damages action would lie against the
President's aides. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 83, at 46-48 (A. Maclaine) (discuss-
ing suit against inferior officer who abuses authority); 2 RECORDS, supra note 75, at 64
(G. Morris) (President's aides "may be punished," at least for criminal acts).
219 When no assistants are available as defendants, the President must have acted
alone. The gist of Professor Freund's argument, quoted supra note 114, is that when
the President acts alone, he may be susceptible to judicial process.
220 Presidential immunity might also help to balance powers in a slightly different
sense, one suggested to me by Robert Cover. The tradition that a former President will
not be held to account for his conduct in office may underlie another tradition, one that
Americans take for granted. This is the tradition of smooth and nonviolent transfers of
power from one administration to the next. In many other societies, where former
heads of government are frequently tried and punished for their "abuses" of power, the
premiers spend large parts of their terms searching for ways to cling to authority-or to
protect themselves when they finally leave office. Their efforts may include compiling
information on political opponents to purchase a safer retirement; the arrest or assassi-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The journey has been a little long, but in the end, the outcome in
the presidential immunity case turns out not to be so startling.221 The
decision conforms to tradition and to intuition. Constitutional tradition
holds that the courts declare what the law is, and nothing in the case
prevents them from doing that. Intuition suggests that the President is
not above the law, and nothing in the decision places him there. That
leaves the question of who decides what should happen when the Presi-
dent chooses not to do what the courts decree. In a political system, that
is a political question. If Nixon v. Fitzgerald makes a statement about
constitutional law, the statement is probably that absent extraordinary
necessity, it is for the political actors in the system-members of Con-
gress and the voting public-to deal with presidential misconduct.
This theory reflects a view of the Constitution as a political as
well as a legal document and a view of the federal government as the
proper province not only of the courts but of the other branches as well.
It would be all too easy to leave every issue arising under the Constitu-
tion to judicial resolution, but Nixon v. Fitzgerald is a subtle reminder
that the courts cannot govern alone-and that the system's political ac-
tors should not want them to. In this sense, the presidential immunity
decision may be viewed as a kind of call to action. If there is a prevail-
ing view that the presidency is getting out of hand, then the time has
come for the government's potentially most powerful branch to reas-
sume supremacy. The power to make law includes the power to punish
and rests mainly with the legislature. The legislature does not do its job
unless it is willing to legislate, to reach decisions, to set policy. These
are the tasks that a Congress that governs ought to be performing.
Every day that it does less-that the voters do not force it to do
more-it is acquiescing in a shift of power to the executive branch.
Congressional weakness, because it threatens to upset the balance of
power, results in calls for extra-constitutional remedies. Those extra-
nation of likely successors; the perversion of governmental apparatus for rapid pecuni-
ary gain for a safer retirement; or even the suspension of democratic processes, making
an orderly succession impossible. Americans are fond of saying that it can't happen
here, but whenever something that might happen doesn't happen, there is a reason for
its nonoccurrence.
221 To say that the result is not startling is not to approve the reasoning process
through which the majority reached it. One may appreciate the essence of a thing with-
out liking all of its form. A reader may say of Nixon v. Fitzgerald much the same thing
that Mikhail Botvinnik, then chess champion of the world, said of a game he contested
with Bobby Fischer, then a teenaged prodigy. The game was complex and exciting and
hopelessly flawed, leading the world champion to comment later on: "'Too many mis-
takes?' the reader may justly ask. Yes, there were rather a lot!" B. FISCHER, MY
SIXTY MEMORABLE GAMES 253 (1969) (quoting Mikhail Botvinnik).
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constitutional remedies, however, might in turn destroy the balanced
system they are meant to preserve.
The message of Nixon v. Fitzgerald appears to be that the Su-
preme Court will not in the absence of extraordinary necessity act to
save Congress from its own weakness, to punish a President that the
legislature is unable to control. It is up to the political actors to save
themselves. If they do not, then the federal courts, sitting on the side-
lines, might finally be forced to enter the game. By the time they do,
however, it may be too late. If it is, then the other players will have
only themselves to blame.
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